Security requirement

Routers and Switches

Deutsche Telekom Group

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Summary
This document sets out the specific technical security requirements for routers and switches.

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1. Introduction

This security document has been prepared based on the general security policies of the Group.

The security requirement is used as a basis for an approval in the PSA process, among other things. It also serves as an implementation standard for units which do not participate in the PSA process. These requirements shall be taken into account from the very beginning, including during the planning and decision-making processes. When implementing these security requirements, the precedence of national, international and supranational law shall be observed.

If compliance with the described requirements can not be achieved or is only partially feasible in individual cases, a risk assessment must be carried out together with a Security- and/or Data Privacy Expert (in accordance with the relevant requirement) and possible alternative protective measures agreed.

2. System hardening

Req 1	Any services and protocols that are not secure and not used must be disabled.

Many network devices offer services which may not be used in the Deutsche Telekom Group's networks on account of known security vulnerabilities such as non-encrypted transmission or inadequate authentication, etc. These services must be completely disabled. The services not to be used are:

- FTP
- TFTP
- Telnet
- rlogin, RCP, RSH
- HTTP
- SNMPv1 and v2
- SSHv1
- TCP/UDP Small Servers (Echo, Chargen, Discard und Daytime)
- Finger
- BOOTP server
- Discovery protocols (CDP, LLDP)
- IP Identification Service (Identd)
- PAD
- MOP

As an alternative to disabling the HTTP service, it is also possible for this service to remain active for reasons of user friendliness. In this case, however, queries to the web service may not be answered directly on this port but must be diverted to a port on which the encrypted HTTPS protocol is used.
Discovery protocols such as the Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) or the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) must be completely disabled. These protocols may be used in well-founded, exceptional cases. However, it must be ensured that the protocols are only active on internal links. Discovery protocols must be disabled on interfaces to customers or devices.

Should additional services be available on a network devices, a check should be carried out in each case to establish whether the services are necessary for the operation of the network devices. Otherwise these services shall be disabled.

Motivation: The protocols named display various security vulnerabilities. A large proportion of the protocol messages is transmitted in plain text, for example. An attacker who is able to record such communication is then able to obtain confidential data such as user names and passwords. Another vulnerability inherent in the aforementioned services is the susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks (DoS). These can be used by attackers to compromise network device availability.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.42-1/7.0

Req 2	The IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of all the interfaces must be statically configured.

The IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of all the interfaces must be permanently-configured. This means that the automatic assignment of IP addresses, e.g., using DHCPv4/v6 or IPv6 auto-configuration for network devices, is not permitted. IPv6 router advertisements must be ignored by network devices.

It is recommended to form the host share of the IPv6 addresses randomly. Due to the very large address area of IPv6, it is very time-consuming for an attacker to use scans to discover systems.

Motivation: The automatic configuration of IP addresses enables a connected attacker to tamper with the network device, so that he may be able to divert traffic or impair communication.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.42-2/7.0

Req 3	Management traffic must be separated from signalling and commercial traffic.

Data traffic for the management of a network device must be physically or logically separated from any other traffic. Physical separation is, for example, a separate dedicated interface via which the network device is connected to a separate management network. Logical separation can be achieved via VPNs or VLANs. In this case, traffic is transmitted within the same physical network as other traffic but is logically separate. Thus direct access to the management of the network device from the production network i.e., possible access by customers, is therefore prevented.

Motivation: The management services and traffic are an attractive target for attackers. By recording management traffic, an attacker may obtain important information which can be used to prepare and carry out attacks. Direct accessibility of the management services by customers or from within the Internet increases the risk of a successful attack against a network device. Since system administration with high-level access rights normally takes place via such services, an attacker might compromise the entire network device via this and, in doing so, gain unauthorized access to the network device and any networks connected to it.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.42-3/7.0

Req 4	The accessibility of management services must be restricted to legitimate systems.

Access can be restricted, for example, through filters, access lists or a local firewall. The restriction must be as strict as posible.This means to host or network adresses to achive that the managment services can only be reached from legitimated systems.

Motivation: Management services enable access to network devices in order to perform operational tasks. In the event of a successful attack, an attacker may gain access to confidential information or even to the entire system. By restricting the accessibility to legitimate systems, the group of potential attackers can be reduced, and thus also the likeliness of a successful attack.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.42-4/7.0

Req 5	Management services must be permanently connected to an address.

The management services (e.g., SSH, HTTPS or SNMP) that are active on a network device must be permanently connected to an address of the network device. Hence the required separation of management traffic from control and

user traffic is the appropriate adress from the management address range. This ensures that the relevant traffic always comes from a fixed sender address and on the other side the management servicve can be reached under the same address at any time.

Motivation: Without the implementation of this measure, it cannot be clearly foreseen with which sender address packets of the management services of the network device are sent out or on which address management services are reachable. This causes a number of disadvantages. Thus recognition of attacks in logging and monitoring and the analysis of the data arising therefrom is made much more difficult. In addition, a permanent sender address is important for implementing filters and firewall rules and for checking the authenticity of keys and certificates when using cryptographic procedures to secure management services and traffic.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.42-5/7.0

Req 6	Unused interfaces must be disabled.

Unused interfaces of a network device shall be disabled. It must be assured that interfaces remain inactive after a reboot.

Motivation: Unused interfaces are usually not taken into account in the configuration process of a network device. As a result, these interfaces are operated with the manufacturer's default configuration. This may enable an attacker who has direct physical access to such a network device to gain unauthorized access to the system or to networks connected to it.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.42-6/7.0

Req 7	Only required software may be used on the system.

In the installation routines for software provided by the supplier, individual components of the software are often preselected as standard installations, which are not necessary for the operation and function of a specific system. This also includes parts of software that are installed as application examples (e.g. default web pages, sample databases, test data), but are typically not used afterwards.

Such components must be specifically deselected (not installed) during the installation of the system or - if deselection during installation is not possible - removed immediately afterwards.

In principle, no software may be used that is not required for the operation, maintenance or function of the system.

Motivation: Vulnerabilities in a system's software are gateways for attackers. By uninstalling unnecessary components, the potential attack surfaces can be significantly reduced.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-3/8.0

Req 8	The proxy ARP function must be disabled.

ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) requests are used by systems to request the MAC address of other systems in the

same network based on the known IP address. This is a layer-2 protocol which can only be used within a network and not across routers. The proxy ARP function cancels this limitation whereby the router or switch functions as the broker for such requests. The proxy ARP function is typically not used in networks and should be disabled due to the resulting risk. Should this function actually be required in a network, a check should be carried out in each case to establish whether the associated risk is acceptable.

Motivation: An attacker can use the proxy ARP function under certain circumstances in order to carry out typical layer-2 attacks such as ARP spoofing or denial-of-service attacks.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.23-8/7.0

Req 9	Gratuitous ARP requests may not be accepted.

Gratuitous ARPs are ARP messages which a system can send in a network in order to inform other systems about its IP address. ARP requests are normally requests of a system which are sent as and when required. Gratuitous ARP messages are usually not necessary and should be disabled on routers and switches. Under certain circumstances (e.g., when HSRP is used), gratuitous ARP shall be permitted. This depends on the individual case and shall be checked accordingly.

Motivation: An attacker can use gratuitous ARP messages to tamper with the address tables of other systems and thus divert traffic or carry out a denial-of-service attack.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.23-9/7.0

3. System update

Req 10	Software and hardware of the system must be covered by security vulnerability support from the supplier.

Only software and hardware products for which there is security vulnerability support by the supplier may be used in a system.
Such support must include that the supplier

- continuously monitors and analyzes the product for whether it has been affected by security vulnerabilities,
- informs immediately about the type, severity and exploitability of vulnerabilities discovered in the product
- timely provides product updates or effective workarounds to remedy the vulnerabilities.

The security vulnerability support must be in place for the entire period in which the affected product remains in use.

Support phases with limited scope of services
Many suppliers optionally offer time-extended support for their products, which goes beyond the support phase intended for the general market, but is often associated with limitations. Some suppliers define their support fundamentally in increments, which may include limitations even during the final phase before the absolute end date of regular support.
If a product is used within support phases that are subject to limitations, it must be explicitly ensured that these restrictions do not affect the availability of security vulnerability support.

Open Source Software and Hardware
Open Source products are often developed by free organizations or communities; accordingly, contractually agreed security vulnerability support may not be available. In principle, it must also be ensured here that the organization/community (or a third party officially commissioned by them) operates a comprehensive security vulnerability management for the affected product, which meets the above-mentioned criteria and is considered to be reliably established.

Motivation: Hardware and software products for which there is no comprehensive security vulnerability support from the supplier pose a risk. This means that a product is not adequately checked to determine whether it is affected by further developed forms of attack or newly discovered vulnerabilities in technical implementations. Likewise, if there are existing security vulnerabilities in a product, no improvements (e.g. updates, patches) are provided. This results in a system whose weak points cannot be remedied, so that they remain exploitable by an attacker in order to compromise the system or to adversely affect it.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-1/8.0

Req 11	The software used must be obtained from trusted sources and checked for integrity.

The software used on the system must be obtained from trusted sources and checked for integrity before installation.
This requirement applies to all types of software:

- Firmware and microcode for hardware components
- Operating systems
- Software Libraries
- Application Software

- Pre-integrated application solutions, such as software appliances or containers

as well as other software that may be used.

Trusted Sources

Trusted sources are generally considered to be:

- the official distribution and supply channels of the supplier
- third party distributors, provided they are authorized by the supplier and are a legitimate part of the supplier´s delivery channels
- internet downloads, if they are made from official provisioning servers of the supplier or authorized distributors
  (1) If the provisioning server offers various forms of downloads, those protected by encryption or cryptographic signatures must be preferred to those without such protection.
  (2) If the provisioning server secures the transport layer using cryptographic protocols (e.g. HTTPS, sftp), the associated server certificates or server keys/fingerprints must be validated with each download to confirm the identity of the provisioning server; if validation fails, the download must be cancelled and the provisioning server has to be considered an untrusted source.

Integrity Check

The integrity check is intended to ensure that the received software is free of manipulation and malware infection. If available, the mechanisms implemented by the supplier must be used for checking.
Valid mechanisms are:

- physical seals or permanently applied certificates of authenticity (if the software is provided on physical media)
- comparison of cryptographic hash values (e.g. SHA256, SHA512) of the received software against target values, which the supplier provides separately
- verification of cryptographic signatures (e.g. GPG, certificates) with which the supplier provides its software

In addition, a check of the software using an anti-virus or anti-malware scanner is recommended (if the vendor has not implemented any of the aforementioned integrity protection mechanisms for its software, this verification is mandatory).

Extended integrity checking when pulling software from public registries

Public registries allow developers to make any of their own software projects available for use. The range includes projects from well-known companies with controlled development processes, as well as from smaller providers or amateur developers.
Examples of such registries are:

- Code registries (e.g. GitHub, Bitbucket, SourceForge, Python Package Index)
- Container registries (e.g. Docker Hub)

Software from public registries must undergo an extended integrity check before deployment.
In addition to the integrity check components described in the previous section, the extended check is intended to explicitly ensure that the software actually performs its function as described, does not contain inherent security risks such as intentionally implemented malware features, and is not affected by known security vulnerabilities. If the software has direct dependencies on third-party software projects (dependencies are very typical in open source software), which must also be obtained and installed for the use of the software, these must be included in the extended integrity check.

Methods for an extended integrity check can be, for example:

- Strict validation of project/package names (avoidance of confusion with deliberately imitated malicious software projects)
- dynamic code analysis / structured functional checks in a test environment
- static code analysis using a linter (e.g. Splint, JSLint, pylint)
- Examination using a security vulnerability scanner (e.g. Qualys, Nessus)
- Examination using a container security scanner (e.g. JFrog Xray, Harbor, Clair, Docker Scan)

- Examination using an SCA (Software Composition Analysis) tool or dependency scanner (e.g. OWASP Dependency Check, Snyk)

The test methods must be selected and appropriately combined according to the exact form of software delivery (source code, binaries/artifacts, containers).

Motivation: Software supply chains contain various attack vectors. An attacker can start at various points to manipulate software or introduce his own routines and damage or control the target environment in which the software is subsequently used. The attack can occur on the transport or transmission path or on the provisioning source itself. Accordingly, an attack is facilitated if software is not obtained from official and controlled sources or if an integrity check is omitted.
There is a particular risk for software obtained from public registries, as these are open to anyone for the provision of software projects. Perfidious attack methods are known, in which the attacker first provides completely inconspicuous, functional software for a while and as soon as it has established itself and found a certain spread, deliberately hidden malicious code is integrated in future versions. Other methods rely on similar-sounding project names for widely used existing projects or overruling version numbers to inject manipulated software into any solutions based on them.

Implementation example: Obtain the software via the official delivery channels of the supplier. Upon receipt of the software, immediately check for integrity using cryptographic checksums, as provided by the supplier, as well as scan for any infections by known malware using anti-malware / anti-virus scanners. Storage of the tested software on an internal, protected file storage and further use (e.g. rollout to the target systems) only from there.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-2/8.0

Req 12	Known vulnerabilities in the software or hardware of the system must be fixed or protected against misuse.

Known vulnerabilities in software and hardware components must be fixed by installing available system updates from the supplier (e.g. patches, updates/upgrades). Alternatively, the use of workarounds (acute solutions that do not fix the vulnerability, but effectively prevent exploitation) is permissible. Workarounds should only be used temporarily and should be replaced by a regular system update as soon as possible in order to completely close the vulnerabilities.

Components that contain known, unrecoverable vulnerabilities must not be used in a system.

The treatment of newly discovered vulnerabilities must also be continuously ensured for the entire deployment phase of the system and implemented in the continuous operating processes of security patch management.

Motivation: The use of components without fixing contained vulnerabilities significantly increases the risk of a successful compromise. The attacker is additionally favored by the fact that, as a rule, not only detailed information on vulnerabilities that have already become known is openly available, but often also already adapted attack tools that facilitate active exploitation.

Implementation example: Following the initial installation of an operating system from an official installation medium, all currently available patches and security updates are installed.

Additional information:
The primary sources of known vulnerabilities in software/hardware are lists in the release notes as well as the security advisories from the official reporting channels of the supplier or independent CERTs. In particular, the reporting channels are sensibly integrated into continuous processes of security patch management for a system, so that newly discovered vulnerabilities can be registered promptly and led into operational remedial measures.
As a complementary measure to the detection of potentially still contained types of vulnerabilities that have in principle already become known, targeted vulnerability investigations of the system can be carried out. Particularly specialized tools such as automated vulnerability scanners are suitable for this purpose. Examples include: Tenable Nessus, Qualys Scanner Appliance.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-10/8.0

4. Protecting data and information

Req 13	Encrypted protocols must be used for management.

Access to management services may only take place by means of secure protocols (e.g., SSHv2, HTTPS or SNMPv3). This is necessary because when accessing management services of a network device, data requiring protection such as user names, passwords or configuration data is transmitted. In addition, the use of encrypted protocols is also necessary for the transmission of new operating system versions and for updates and patches, etc.

Motivation: When plain text protocols such as Telnet, HTTP, FTP, TFTP or SNMP (version 1 and 2) are used for the management of network devices, an attacker record and manipulate data or posibbly highjack the current session. In his next step, he can then use the information gained for attacks on the network device.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.42-12/7.0

Req 14	Outputs and messages must not disclose information on internal structures of the system.

Information about the internal structures of a system, including the components used there, and corresponding implementation details are generally considered to be in need of protection.

In general, this concerns information on

- Product names and product identifiers of implemented system components
- Operating systems, middleware, backend software, software libraries and internal applications as well as their software versions
- installed service packs, patches, hotfixes
- Serial numbers of components as well as stored product licenses
- Database Structures

Typical examples of outputs and messages in which disclosure of such system information can potentially occur:

- Login windows and dialogs
- Error messages
- Status messages
- Banners of active network services
- System logs and log files
- Debug logs, stack traces

As far as it is technically feasible without impairing the function and operation of the system, the output of affected system information must always be deactivated.

Access to affected system information must only be possible for authorized users of the system. As a rule, this circle of authorized users is to be limited to administrators and operators of the system. Access for authorized monitoring and inventory systems within the operating environment is also permitted.

A permissible exception to these restrictions exists for specific individual system information, the disclosure of which is technically mandatory for the intended function of the system in conjunction with third-party systems; For example, the presentation of supported protocols and their versions during the initial parameter negotiation in session setups between a client and a server.

Motivation: Information about the internal structures of a system can be used by an attacker to prepare attacks on the system extremely effective. For example, an attacker can derive any known vulnerabilities of a product from the software version in order to exploit them specifically during the attack on the system.

Implementation example: [Example 1]
Deactivation of the display of the product name and the installed version of a Web server in its delivered error web pages.

[Example 2]
Removal of the product name and the corresponding version string from the login banner of a deployed SSH server.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-9/8.0

Req 15	Stored data in need of protection must be protected against unauthorized access, modification and deletion.

The need for protection of stored data depends on its classification (e.g. according to applicable legal data privacy requirements, regulatory requirements, contractual obligations), the potential damage in the event of its misuse, and other relevant factors (e.g. the location of storage). The nature and extent of protective measures must be appropriately chosen.
Stored authentication attributes such as passwords, private keys, tokens or certificates etc. are generally considered to be in need of protection. Data that determines the functionality and security-relevant behavior of a system (e.g. system configuration files, operating systems and kernels, drivers) are also considered to be fundamentally in need of protection.

Compliance with the protection objectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability must be consistently guaranteed for stored data in need of protection. This also applies during only short-term storage (e.g. when storing in a web cache or in a temporary folder within a data processing chain).

Basically, access to data in need of protection in a system must be fully regulated on the basis of technically implemented authorization assignments and controls.
If such technical access control alone is no longer sufficient to ensure the necessary protection requirements of stored data, or if its effectiveness cannot be consistently ensured, additional cryptographic methods (e.g. encryption, signing, hashing) must be implemented. Cryptographic methods used for the storage of data must be recognised and effective for this purpose and must not have any known vulnerabilities.

Motivation: The storage of data on a system without adequate protection enables an attacker to view, use, disseminate, modify or destroy it without authorization. This potentially opens up additional attack vectors on the immediate and connected other systems and can lead to significant failures, loss of control and damage as well as resulting penalties and loss of reputation towards customers and business partners.

Implementation example: [Example 1]
A system exports data for transport to mobile media. Since the system's technical access control at the file permission level no longer applies as soon as the mobile media is removed from the system, additional measures must be taken to protect the data. Before the system writes the data to the mobile media, it is encrypted accordingly using a suitable algorithm. The associated encryption key is exchanged on a separate channel so that the data can be decrypted and processed again in the legitimate target system. An attacker who takes possession of the mobile media, on the other hand, has no access to the data.

[Example 2]
Only cryptographic hashes of passwords generated with a secure password hashing method are stored in the local user database of a system. For the system, these hashes are sufficient to authenticate users when they log on to the system. However, if an attacker can copy the user database, he does not immediately come into possession of plaintext passwords with which he could log on to the system on behalf of the users.

[Example 3]

On a system, the configuration files of the Web server can only be written by the legitimate admin in which corresponding permissions have been set in the file system. The access control of the operating system kernel thus denies all other users of the system to make changes to the configuration files of the web server; including the web server service account itself, which also reduces the attack surface from the outside in case of vulnerabilities in the web server.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Disruption of availability
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-14/8.0

Req 16	Data in need of protection must be protected against unauthorized access and modification during transmission.

The need for protection of data to be transmitted depends on its classification (e.g. according to applicable legal data privacy requirements, regulatory requirements, contractual obligations), the potential damage in the event of its misuse, and other relevant factors (e.g. transmission via public networks). The nature and extent of the protective measures must be appropriately chosen.
Authentication attributes such as passwords or tokens etc. are generally considered to be in need of protection. Data that determines the functionality and security-relevant behavior of a system (e.g. updates & patches, configuration parameters, remote maintenance, control via APIs) are also considered to be fundamentally in need of protection.

Compliance with the protection objectives of confidentiality and integrity must be consistently guaranteed during the transmission of data in need of protection.

As a rule, this requires the implementation of cryptographic methods (e.g. encryption, signatures, Hashes).
Cryptographic methods may
- be applied directly to the data before transmission, which can make subsequent transmission acceptable even via insecure channels
- be used on the transmission channel to create a secure channel and protect any kind of data passing through it
- or be implemented as a combination of both.

Cryptographic methods used for the transmission of data must be recognized and effective for this purpose and must have no known vulnerabilities.

Motivation: The transmission of data without adequate protection enables an attacker to intercept, use, disseminate, modify or remove it from transmission without authorization. This potentially opens up further attack vectors on the immediate target systems as well as connected other systems and can lead to significant failures, loss of control and damage as well as resulting penalty claims and reputational losses towards customers and business partners.

Implementation example: [Example 1]
Confidential documents are encrypted before they are sent by e-mail to the customer.

[Example 2]
An administrator configures a new cloud application over the Internet. Access is via a TLS-encrypted connection ("https").

[Example 3]
A system obtains automatic software updates from an update server. The update server delivers the software updates cryptographically signed. The system can thus validate the received software updates and reliably rule out that they have been manipulated during transmission.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

- Unauthorized modification of data
- Disruption of availability
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-15/8.0

5. Protecting availability and integrity

Req 17	Directed broadcasts must be disabled

IP-directed broadcasts are packets which are sent to a broadcast address of a subnet with which the sending system has no direct connection. IP-directed broadcasts are used in a network in exceptional cases only. IP-directed broadcasts can be misused for denial-of-service attacks. The option to pass on such packets on a router must therefore be disabled.

Motivation: IP-directed broadcasts can be exploited by an attacker to perform SMURF denial-of-service attacks.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.23-17/7.0

Req 18	Packets with IPv6 routing header must be ignored.

Two routing header types are defined in the IPv6 standard. These are types 0 (for source routing) and 2 (for mobile IPv6). Both options should not occur in a network. Such packets must therefore be ignored by a network element.

Motivation: Type 0 IPv6 routing headers can be exploited by an attacker in order to interfere with decisions regarding pathways. This can be exploited, on the one hand to evade security mechanisms, and on the other to impair availability.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.23-18/7.0

Req 19	Packets which must be processed via the operating system of the network device must not lead to impairment of availability, even when they occur in great numbers.

Particular packets mean that processing implemented within the hardware is no longer possible and processing of the relevant task must be undertaken by the operating system. This has a direct impact on system ressources like CPU and memory of the network device. Examples of such behavior are:

- Generating response packets to ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 queries.
- Generating ICMP response packets such as Destination Unreachable, Packet too Big etc. for particular packets.
- Generating response packets for packets with expired TTL/Hop Limit value.
- Processing IPv6 packets with Hop-by-Hop or Destinations Options headers.

The behaviour of the network device can often be configured that or only a certain number of such packets are processed (rate limit) or such packets are rejected.

Motivation: Packets that a network device will operate by the operating system lead to load of the processor and working memory. Without an applicable protection a attacker can use massively send packets to compromise the availability of the network device.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.42-16/7.0

Req 20	Packets with IPv4 options must be ignored.

IP options (e.g., source routing) are only required in modern networks in exceptional cases. Because appropriate packets are a threat for a network device the handling of packets with IP options enabled must be disabled or filtered.

Motivation: Packages with IP options require extended processing by the network device. This means that processing such packets at the hardware level is not possible. An attacker can exploit this in order to carry out denial-of-service attacks against an affected network device.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.42-17/7.0

Req 21	The IPv6 hop-by-hop header of packets that do not come from trustworthy senders must be ignored.

The IPv6 standard defines that packets with Hop-by-Hop extension headers must be processed by every system on the path between the source and the destination of a communication, because they may contain further instructions. This processing is time-consuming and normally cannot be performed at the hardware level of a network device. It must therefore be ensured that such packets forwarded by the network device without processing, or only be processed if they come from the address of a trustworthy sender.

Motivation: An attacker may exploit packets with IPv6 Hop-by-Hop extension headers in order to produce a high load on a network device. This may lead to the impairment of the availability of the network device.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.42-18/7.0

Req 22	Packets with IPv6 Destination Options headers that are sent to an address of the network device and do not come from a trustworthy sender must be rejected

The IPv6 standard defines that packets with Destination Options headers must be processed by the recipient's system, since they may contain further instructions. This processing is time-consuming and normally cannot be performed at the hardware level of a network device. It must therefore be ensured that such packets are not processed at all, or only if they come from the address of a trustworthy sender.

Motivation: An attacker may exploit packets with IPv6 Destination Options headers in order to produce a high load on a network device. This may lead to the impairment of the availability of the network device.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.42-19/7.0

Req 23	Fragmented IPv6 packets that are sent to an address of the network device must be rejected.

The occurrence of fragmented IPv6 packets that are sent to an address of a network device is very unlikely and should not happen in a properly designed network. Therefore all fragmented IPv6 packets that are sent to one or more of a network device's addresses must be rejected by that network device. When necessary fragmented packets can be allowed inside the infrastrukture address range of the network.

Motivation: An attacker may exploit fragmented IPv6 packets in order to produce a high load on a network device. This may lead to the impairment of the availability of the network device.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.42-20/7.0

Req 24	ICMPv4 and v6 types which are not required for operation must be disabled.

There are different types of ICMP4 and v6 that are not used in most networks, but represent a risk. These types must be disabled or filtered and not be answered, send or processed by the network device. The following ICMP types are permitted and may be used in networks of Deutsche Telekom AG:

- Echo Request [Type 8 (v4), Type 128 (v6)]
- Echo Reply [Type 0 (v4), Type 129 (v6)]
- Destination Unreachable [Type 3 (v4), Type 1 (v6)]
- Time Exceeded [Type 11 (v4), Type 3 (v6)]
- Parameter Problem [Type 12 (v4), Type 4 (v6)]
- Packet Too Big [Type 2 (only v6)]
- Neighbor Solicitation [Type 135 (only v6)]
- Neighbor Advertisement [Type 136 (only v6)]

It is possible that other types will be necessary. This should be checked in each individual case. The ICMPv4 types "Timestamp Reply (14)," "Netmask Reply (18)," "Information Reply (16)" and "Redirect (5)" must not be responded to or processed under any circumstances.

Motivation: ICMPv4 and v6 packets can be used by an attacker to request specific information from a network device which can be helpful for planning further attacks. In addition, it may be possible to influence the availability of systems.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.42-21/7.0

Req 25	The maximum number of ICMPv4 and v6 response packages sent per second must be restricted.

Different packets or events lead to a situation where these have to be answered by a network device with an ICMP packet. Such packets or events include, for example, ICMP queries such as Echo Reply, packets with an expired TTL/ Hop Limit field or packets that exceed the permitted MTU, but must not be fragmented. Since the production of ICMP response packets cannot be processed at the hardware level with many network devices, this leads to a strain on the

processor and the RAM. For this reason, the maximum number of ICMP response packets that may be produced per second must be limited (rate limit).

Motivation: An attacker can send large numbers of tampered packets to a network device in order to compel the production of ICMP response packets. This may lead to a high load and thus to an impairment of the availability of the network device.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.42-22/7.0

Req 26	Manipulated packets, that are sent to an address of the network device, must not lead to an impairment of availability.

A network device shall be not effected in its availability or robustness by packets that are manipulated or differing the norm. This means that appropriate packets must be detected as invalid and be discarded. The process shall not be effect the performance of the network device. This robustness must be just as effective for a great mass of invalid packets as for individual or a small number of packets.

Examples of such packets are:
- Mass-produced TCP packets with a set SYN flag to produce half-open TCP connections (SYN flooding attack)
- Packets with the same IP sender address and IP recipient address (Land attack)
- Mass-produced ICMP packets with the broadcast address of a network as target address (Smurf attack)
- Fragmented IP packets with overlapping offset fields (Teardrop attack)
- ICMP packets that are larger than the maximum permitted size (65,535 Bytes) of IPv4 packets (Ping-of-death attack)

Sometimes the relevant behaviour of the network device must be configured. In other cases, the behaviour of the network device may only be verified by the relevant tests.

Motivation: An attacker can use tampered packets to perform so-called denial-of-service attacks, in order to impair the availability of the network device as a whole or in part. Sometimes it only requires individual packets, or a few of them, to make a vulnerable network device crash.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability

For this requirement the following warranty objectives are relevant:
- Availability

ID: 3.42-23/7.0

Req 27	The system must be implemented robustly against unexpected inputs.

Data transferred to the system must first be validated before further processing to ensure that the data corresponds to the expected data type and format. This is intended to eliminate the risk of manipulation of system processes and states by appropriately constructed data content. Validation must be carried out for any data that is transferred to the system. Examples include user input, values in data fields, and log contents.

The following typical implementation mistakes must be avoided:
- lack of validation of the length of passed data

- Incorrect assumptions about the format of data
- lack of validation of received data for conformity with the specification
- Inadequate handling of protocol deviations in received data
- Insufficient limitation of recursion when parsing complex data formats
- Insufficient implementation of whitelisting or escaping to protect against inputs outside the valid value range

Motivation: An attacker can use specifically engineered data content to try to put a system that does not sufficiently validate received data before internal processing into an unstable state or to trigger unauthorized actions within the system. The damage potential of such attacks depends on the individual system, but has a theoretical range from uncontrolled system crashes to a controlled execution of specially injected code and the resulting complete compromise of a system.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-11/8.0

Req 28	The system must be protected against overload situations.

A system must have protective mechanisms that prevent overload situations as far as possible.
In particular, a partial or complete impairment of the availability of the system must be avoided.

Examples of possible protective measures are:
- Limiting the amount of memory (RAM) available per application
- Limiting the maximum sessions of a web application
- Limiting the maximum size of a dataset
- Limiting CPU resources per process
- Prioritizing processes
- Limiting the number or size of transactions by a user or from an IP address over time

Note:
A system can usually not protect itself against network-based attacks with extremely high data or packet rates, the so-called "Distributed Denial of Service" (DDoS) attacks. To defend against DDoS attacks, an upstream solution in the network layer is required.

Motivation: Attackers can try to use up the resources of a system with targeted resource-intensive or large-volume requests, so that the system can no longer fulfill its regular tasks or intended task volumes and the availability of the services offered is effectively disrupted. Limiting the maximum resources that can be used per request made to the system is a fundamental measure to reduce the impact of such denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.01-12/8.0

Req 29	In overload situations, the system must behave in a predictable manner.

Even comprehensive native protections may not be able to prevent a system from becoming overloaded in extreme situations.

It must therefore be ensured that, in overload situations, the system does not switch to a state that overrides security-relevant functions or properties of the system. Performance losses (e.g. the reduction of the throughput of legitimate network packets or the number of answered server requests per period) are usually unavoidable in overload situations, but the regular functional behavior of the system must be fundamentally preserved.

In extreme cases, this can mean that a controlled shutdown of the system is more acceptable than continued operation in the event of uncontrolled failure of the security functions and thus the loss of system protection.

Motivation: By means of a denial-of-service attack, an attacker can try to overload a system in a targeted manner. If such a system then reacts unpredictably or fails its regular behavior, especially with regard to its security functions, this can open up an extended attack surface for the attacker on functions and data of the system and potentially endanger other linked systems.

Implementation example: A firewall that discards its filter rules in overload situations and forwards all packets without checking would not meet the requirement. In this case, blocking all packets by shutting down the firewall would be more acceptable than failing their regular task of protecting downstream systems.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-13/8.0

6. Authentication and authorization

Req 30	If the network device is operated in an insecure environment, the restoration or bypassing of start and system passwords must be prevented.

Many network devices have a function that resets the current system password (password reset). For network devices operated in public areas or areas in which access cannot be controlled by Deutsche Telekom AG, this function shall be disabled. If this should not be possible, it is to be ensured that after resetting the password, an attacker cannot access the configuration of the network device, in which the configuration is irrecoverably deleted.

Motivation: An attacker with access to a network device could reset or bypass the system password if this measure was not complied with, and thus gain unauthorized access to the relevant network device, its configuration or the networks connected to it. Furthermore, analysis of the configuration could provide information that could be used for attacks on other systems in the Deutsche Telekom AG network.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data

ID: 3.42-27/7.0

Req 31	Predefined user accounts that are not required must be deleted or at least disabled.

On many systems, there are predefined but unused user accounts (e.g. "guest") after the initial installation.

These predefined user accounts must be deleted or at least disabled immedately after the initial installation; if these measures are not feasible, the corresponding user accounts must be blocked for remote access. In any case, disabled or blocked user accounts must also be provided with an authentication attribute (e.g. a password or an SSH key) so that unauthorized use of such a user account is prevented in the event of a misconfiguration.

Excempt from the requirement to delete or disable predefined user accounts are user accounts that are used exclusively for internal use on the corresponding system and that are required for the functionality of one or more applications of the system. Even for such a user account, it must be ensured that remote access or local login is not possible and that a user of the system cannot misuse such a user account.

Motivation: User accounts that are predefined by default in a product are typically common knowledge and can be targeted by an attacker for brute force and dictionary attacks. If these user accounts are not needed in a specific system, their existence represents an unnecessary attack surface. A particular risk is posed by predefined user accounts that are preconfigured without a password or with a well-known standard password. Such user accounts can be misused directly by an attacker if their security hardening was missed due to the unplanned use in the specific system.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-7/8.0

Req 32	Predefined authentication attributes must be changed.

After the takeover or initial installation of a system, there are usually predefined authentication attributes (e.g. passwords, SSH keys, SSL/TLS Certificates) in the system, as assigned by manufacturers, developers, suppliers or automated installation routines.

Such predefined authentication attributes must be changed to new, individual values immediately after the takeover or installation of the system.

Motivation: Values predefined by third parties in authentication attributes cannot be trusted because they do not represent a controlled secret. Affected authentication attributes can be misused by unauthorized persons to access and compromise systems. This risk is significantly increased if commonly known default values are used for authentication attributes (e.g. a default password for the administrator user account in a particular software product).

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-8/8.0

Req 33	The use of system functions that require protection as well as access to internal or confidential data must not be possible without prior authentication and authorization.

The use of functions of the system that require protection as well as access to data classified as internal or confidential must only be possible after the user has been uniquely identified and successfully authenticated by means of the user name and at least one authentication attribute. In addition, it must be verified that the user is authorized to access the affected functions and data within the user role assigned to him or her in the system.

An exception to this are functions and data that may be used publicly without restriction; for example, the area of a website on the Internet where only public information is provided.

Examples of features that require prior authentication include:
- Remote access to network services (such as SSH, SFTP, web services)
- Local access to the management console
- Local use of operating system and applications

Examples of authentication features that can be used:
- Passwords
- cryptographic keys or certificates (e.g., in the form of smart cards)

This requirement also applies without restriction to any machine access to the system (here the implementation is usually carried out by using so-called M2M - "Machine-to-Machine" - user accounts).

Motivation: The unambiguous authentication and authorization of access to a system are elementary to protect functions and data from misuse.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-19/8.0

Req 34	User accounts must be protected with at least one authentication attribute.

All user accounts in a system must be protected against unauthorized use.

For this purpose, the user account must be secured with an authentication attribute that enables the accessing user to be unambiguously authenticated. Common authentication attributes are e.g.:
- passwords, passphrases, PINs (factor KNOWLEDGE: "something that only the legitimate user knows")

- cryptographic keys, tokens, smart cards, OTP (factor OWNERSHIP: "something that only the legitimate user has")
- biometric features such as fingerprints or hand geometry (factor INHERENCE: "something that only the legitimate user is")

The authentication of users by means of an authentication attribute that can be faked or spoofed by an attacker (e.g. telephone numbers, IP addresses, VPN affiliation) is generally not permitted.

In companies of Deutsche Telekom group where the MyCard or a comparable smartcard is available this should be a preferred authentication attribute.

If the system and the application scenario support it, multiple independent authentication attributes should be combined if possible in order to achieve an additional increase in security (so-called MFA or Multi-Factor-Authentication).

Motivation: User accounts that are not protected by appropriate authentication attributes can be abused by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a system and the data and applications stored on it.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-20/8.0

Req 35	Privileged user accounts must be protected with at least two authentication attributes from different factors.

A privileged user account is a user account with extended authorizations within a system. Extended authorizations enable access to configuration settings, functions or data that are not available to regular users of the system. In direct dependence on the special tasks that are carried out via a privileged user account within a system, the assigned extended authorizations can be specifically restricted or include completely unrestricted system access.

Examples of privileged user accounts:
- Accounts for administration, maintenance or troubleshooting tasks
- Accounts for user administration tasks (e.g. creating/deleting users; assigning permissions or roles; resetting passwords)
- Accounts that are authorized to legitimize, initiate or prevent business-critical processes
- Accounts that have access to data classified as SCD (Sensitive Customer Data) in the interests of Group Deutsche Telekom, its customers or the public
- Accounts that have extensive access to data defined as "personal" according to the EU-GDPR (e.g. mass retrieval of larger parts or the complete database)

A single authentication attribute for privileged user accounts with their extended authorizations is usually no longer sufficient.

In order to achieve an adequate level of protection, at least two mutually independent authentication attributes must be used. The authentication attributes must come from various factors (knowledge, ownership, inherence). A combination of authentication attributes of the same factor (e.g. two different passwords) is not permitted

This approach is commonly referred to as MFA (Multi-Factor Authentication).
A specific form of MFA is 2FA (2-factor authentication), which combines exactly two authentication attributes.

Motivation: Privileged user accounts represent an increased risk to the security of a system. If an attacker successfully compromises such a user account, he receives extensive authorizations with which he can bring the system or system parts under his control, disrupt system functions, view/manipulate processed data or influence business-critical processes. The combination of multiple authentication attributes of different types significantly minimizes the risk of a user account being compromised.

Implementation example: Very popular is 2FA in a variant consisting of an attribute that the user knows (factor KNOWLEDGE) and an attribute that the user possesses (factor OWNERSHIP).
Examples of such a 2FA are:

- smartcard (e.g. MyCard) plus PIN
- private key plus passphrase
- classic password plus hardware token for the generation of OTPs

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-21/8.0

Req 36	User accounts must ensure the unique identification of the user.

Users must be identified unambiguously by the system.

This can typically be reached by using a unique user account per user.

So-called group accounts, which are characterized by the fact that they are used jointly by several people, must not be used. This also applies without restriction to privileged user accounts. Most systems initially have only a single user account with administrative privileges after the basic installation. If the system is to be administered by several persons, each of these persons must use a personal, individual user account to which appropriate administrative authorizations or roles are assigned

A special feature are so named technical user accounts. These are used for the authentication and authorization of systems among themselves or of applications on a system and can therefore not be assigned to a specific person. Such user accounts must be assigned on a per system or per application basis. In this connection, it has to be ensured that these user accounts can't be misused.
Ways to prevent misuse of such user accounts by individuals include:

- Configuration of a password that meets the security requirements and is known to as few administrators as possible.
- Configuring the user account that only a local use is possible and a interactive login isn't possible.
- Use of a technique for authentication of the specific user account with public and private key or certificates.
- Limiting the access over the network to legitimate systems.

Additional solution must be checked on their usability per individual case.

Motivation: Unambiguous user identification is mandatory to assign a user permissions that are necessary to perform the required tasks on the system. This is the only way to adequately control access to system data and services and to prevent misuse. Furthermore, it makes it possible to log activities and actions on a system and to assign them to individual users.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-22/8.0

Req 37	The permissions for users and applications must be limited to the extent necessary to fulfill their tasks.

The permissions on a system must be restricted to such an extent that a user can only access data and use functions that he needs in the context of his work. Appropriate permissions must also be assigned for access to files that are part of the operating system or applications or that are generated by the same (e.g. configuration and logging files).

In addition to access to data, applications and their components must also be executed with the lowest possible permissions. Applications should not be run with administrator or system privileges.

Motivation: If a user is granted too far-reaching permissions on a system, he can access data and applications to an extent that is not necessary for the fulfillment of the assigned tasks. This creates an unnecessarily increased risk in the event of abuse, in particular if the user or his user account is compromised by an attacker.
Applications with too far-reaching permissions can be misused by an attacker to gain or expand unauthorized access to data and system areas in need of protection.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-23/8.0

7. Protecting sessions

Req 38	Sessions must be protected against unauthorized takeover ("session hijacking").

Interfaces that provide session functionality to the system must implement technical measures to prevent a legitimate user's session from being taken over and continued by an unauthorized third party.

Such protection can be achieved, for example, by implementing a combination of the following options that makes sense for the specific system:

- At the transport layer: Use of the TCP protocol (with its sequence numbers) and corresponding filter lists
- At the session layer: Use of the TLS Protocol
- At the application layer: Negotiation of a random secret session key between sender and receiver to authorize all session traffic (e.g. session ID, session cookie, session token)
- Use of cryptographic methods to protect session keys from eavesdropping or modification attacks

Motivation: Unprotected sessions can potentially be hijacked and continued by an attacker in order to exercise unauthorized access to the system in the context of the affected user.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-16/8.0

Req 39	The system must allow users to log out of their current session.

The system must have a feature that enables the logged-in user to log out at any time. It must not be possible to resume a logged-out session without re-authenticating the user.

Motivation: A user must retain complete control over the sessions he has established in order to be able to terminate his access to a system at any time according to the situation and thus protect data and functions exposed via this access. In addition, the user must be able to assume that sessions specifically terminated by him cannot subsequently be resumed and continued by unauthorized third parties.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-17/8.0

Req 40	Sessions must be automatically terminated after a period of inactivity adapted to the intended use.

It is necessary that sessions on a system are automatically terminated after a specified period of inactivity.

For this reason, a time-out for sessions must be set. The time period to be selected here depends on the use of the system and, if applicable, the physical environment. For example, the time-out for an application in an unsecured environment must be shorter (a few minutes) than the time-out for an application used by operations personnel for system monitoring tasks in an access-protected area (60 minutes or more).

Motivation: For an open but unused session, there is a risk that an illegitimate user may take over and continue it unnoticed in order to exercise unauthorized access to the system and the data contained therein on behalf of the affected user.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-18/8.0

8. Authentication parameter password

Req 41	If passwords are used as an authentication attribute, those must be stored using a suitable and approved "Password Hashing" method to protect against offline-attacks like brute force or dictionary attacks.

This requirement relates to the storage of passwords in all types of user databases, as used in this system, in order to authenticate incoming access (local or remote) by users or other systems.

If an attacker obtains the copy of a user database of the system, he is able to bring it into a fully independent environment and utilize automatized dictionary or brute force attacks to determine contained passwords. Specialized tools in combination with high computing power allow for high cracking rates in a relatively short period of time, if protective measures are insufficient. Due to the independency from the source system, such an offline attack happens unnoticed.

The following countermeasure must be implemented, since this ensures best possible protection against offline attacks:

- passwords must be stored using a cryptographic one-way function (known as "Password Hashing") that is recognized as effective for this purpose and is classified as secure at the current state of the art.

Please Note: valid password hashing algorithms are described in Security Requirement Catalog "3.50 Cryptographic Algorithms and Security Protocols".

Explicitly NOT PERMISSIBLE is:

- to store passwords in cleartext
- to store passwords in any format which can be directly backcalculated
- to store passwords using reversible encryption

Please Note:
In this context, "directly backcalculatable formats" refers to those that simply encode the password, without involving a secret key in the transformation process. Since the password will no longer show up as original cleartext after it has been processed, those formats may easily be mistaken to provide confidentiality. Effectively, they do not offer any protection. The enconding is fixed and therefore an attacker can easily make use of it to compute the original cleartext password from the encoded string.
Examples for directly backcalculatable formats are: "base64", "rot13"
"Reversible" are all encryption methods which, using the appropriate key, enable encrypted content to be transformed back into the original content. Accordingly, with reversible encryption there is always the challenge of keeping the key secure and protecting it from unauthorized access. Reversibility is a required fundamental property in many areas of encryption applications, e.g. for transferring confidential messages, but it is counterproductive for storing passwords: a stored password must remain comparable by means of technical methods, but it must no longer be possible to convert it back into plain text in order to protect it as well as possible from unauthorized viewing.
Examples for reversible encryption are: "AES", "CHACHA20", "3DES", "RSA"

Motivation: Without protective measures, an attacker in possession of a user database copy is able to determine masses of contained passwords in short time by merely trying out character string combinations or making use of dictionaries. Passwords stored in cleartext or any backcalculatable format are fully defenseless to an offline attack. Once a password has been ascertained it can be used by an attacker for unauthorized access to the system and the data on it.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-24/8.0

Req 42	If a password is used as an authentication attribute, a protection against online attacks like brute force and dictionary attacks that hinder password guessing must be implemented.

Online brute force and dictionary attacks aim for a regular access interface of the system while making use of automated guessing to ascertain passwords for user accounts.

To prevent this, a countermeasure or a combination of countermeasures from the following list must be implemented:

- technical enforcement of a waiting period after a login failed, right before another login attempt will be granted. The waiting period shall increase significantly with any further successive failed login attempt (for example, by doubling the waiting time after each failed attempt)
- automatic disabling of the user account after a defined quantity of successive failed login attempts (usually 5). However, it has to be taken into account that this solution needs a process for unlocking user accounts and an attacker can abuse this to deactivate accounts and make them temporarily unusable
- Using CAPTCHA ("**C**ompletely**A**utomated**P**ublic**T**uring test to tell**C**omputers and**H**umans**A**part") to prevent automated login attempts by machines ("robots" or "bots") as much as possible. A CAPTCHA is a small task that is usually based on graphical or acoustic elements and is difficult to solve by a machine. It must be taken into account that CAPTCHA are usually not barrier-free.

In order to achieve higher security, it is often meaningful to combine two or more of the measures named here. This must be evaluated in individual cases and implemented accordingly.

Motivation: Without any protection mechanism an attacker can possibly determine a password by executing dictionary lists or automated creation of character combinations. With the guessed password than the misuse of the according user account is possible.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-25/8.0

Req 43	If a password is used as an authentication attribute, it must have at least 12 characters and contain three of the following categories: lower-case letters, upper-case letters, digits and special characters.

A system may only accept passwords that comply with the following complexity rules:

- Minimum length of 12 characters.
- Comprising at least three of the following four character categories:
    - lower-case letters
    - upper-case letters
    - digits
    - special characters

The usable maximum length of passwords shall not be limited to less then 25 characters. This will provide more freedom to End Users when composing individual memorizable passwords and helps to prevent undesired behavior in password handling.

When a password is assigned, the system must ensure that the password meets these policies. This must be preferably enforced by technical measures; if such cannot be implemented, organizational measures must be established.
If a central system is used for user authentication [see also Root Security Requirements Document[i] "3.69 IAM (Identity Access Management) - Framework"], it is valid to forward or delegate this task to that central system.

Permissible deviation in the password minimum length
Under security-related criteria, conditions can potentially be identified for a system that enable the minimum password length to be reduced:

- It is generally permissible to reduce the minimum password length for systems that use additional independent authentication attributes within the authentication process in addition to the password (implementation of 2-Factor or Multi-Factor Authentication).
- Any reduction in the minimum password length must be assessed individually by a technical security advisor (e. g. a PSM from Telekom Security) and confirmed as permissible. In the assessment, the surrounding technical, organizational and legal framework parameters must be taken into account, as well as the system-specific protection requirements and the potential amount of damage in the event of security incidents.
- The absolute minimum value of 8 characters length for passwords must not be undercut.

Motivation: Passwords with the above complexity offer contemporary robustness against attacks coupled with acceptable user friendliness. Passwords with this level of complexity have proven their efficiency in practice. Trivial and short passwords are susceptible to brute force and dictionary attacks and are therefore easy for attackers to determine. Once a password has been ascertained it can be used by an attacker for unauthorized access to the system and the data on it.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-26/8.0

Req 44	If a password is used as an authentication attribute for technical accounts, it must have at least 30 characters and contain three of the following categories: lower-case letters, upper-case letters, digits and special characters.

Technical user accounts are characterized by the fact that they are not used by people. Instead, they are used to authenticate and authorize systems to each other or applications on a system.

A system must only use passwords for technical user accounts that meet the following complexity:

- Minimum length of 30 characters
- Comprising at least three of the following four character categories:
    - lower-case letters
    - upper-case letters
    - digits
    - special characters

Motivation: Due to their use in machine-to-machine (M2M) communication scenarios, technical user accounts are often equipped with privileges that can be of high interest to an attacker to compromise infrastructures. Without mechanisms of extensive compromise detection, the risk of a password being determined or broken by an attacker can increase significantly over time. A significant increase in password length counteracts these risks and can also be implemented particularly easily in M2M scenarios, since handling a very long password is not a particular challenge for a machine (as opposed to a person).

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-27/8.0

Req 45	If a password is used as an authentication attribute, the reuse of previous passwords must be prevented.

A history of the previously used passwords must be recorded for each user account. When a password change is initiated for a user account, the new password must be compared with this password history. If the reuse of a password is detected, the password change must be rejected. This validation process must be implemented in the system on the basis of technical measures. If a central IAM system is used for user authentication, the implementation can be forwarded to the central IAM system or outsourced there [see also Root Security Requirements Document[i] "3.69 IAM (Identity Access Management) - Framework"].

In general, the password history should ensure that a password that has already been used can never be used again.

However, due to technical limitations, a password history cannot be recorded indefinitely in many IT/NT products. In this case, the following basic rules must be observed:

- a password that has already been used must not be reusable for a period of at least 60 days (measured from the point in time at which the affected password was replaced by another)
- in systems in which the period of at least 60 days cannot be implemented, the longest possible period must be configured. In addition, it must be confirmed by a Project Security Manager (PSM) that the configured period is still sufficient in the overall context of the system with regard to the security requirement.

Annotation:
Some IT/NT products do not offer any technical configuration parameters with which the password history can be linked directly to a time period, but only allow the definition of the number of passwords to be recorded. In such cases, the time period can alternatively be ensured by linking the following, usually generally available configuration parameters. Within the resulting policy, a user can only change his password once a day and, due to the number of passwords recorded, can reuse an old password effectively after 60 days at the earliest.

- Minimum Password Age: 1 day
- Password History: Record of the last 60 passwords used

With this implementation variant, it should be noted that the minimum age for the password should not be more than one day in order not to inappropriately restrict the user with regard to the fundamental need to be able to change the password independently at any time.

Motivation: Users prefer passwords that are easy to remember and often use them repeatedly over long periods of time when the system allows. From the user's point of view, the behavior is understandable, but effectively leads to a considerable reduction in the protective effect of this authentication parameter. With adequate knowledge of the user or information obtained from previous system compromises, an attacker can gain access to supposedly protected user accounts. Particularly in situations in which new initial passwords are assigned centrally as part of an acute risk treatment, but users change them immediately to a previous password for the sake of simplicity, there is a high risk that an attacker will resume illegal access. It is therefore important to prevent users from reusing old passwords.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-28/8.0

Req 46	If a password is used as an authentication attribute, users must be able to independently change the password anytime.

The system must offer a function that enables a user to change his password at any time.

When an external centralized system for user authentication is used, it is valid to redirect or implement this function on this system.

Motivation: The fact that a user can change his authentication attribute himself at any time enables him to change it promptly if he suspects that it could have been accessed by a third party.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-29/8.0

Req 47	If a password is used as an authentication attribute, it must be changed after 12 months at the latest.

The maximum permitted usage period for passwords is 12 months.
If a password reaches the maximum permitted usage period, it must be changed.

For this purpose, the system must automatically inform the user about the expired usage period the next time he logs on to the system and immediately guide him through a dialog to change the password. Access to the system must no longer be permitted without a successfully completed password change.
For technical user accounts (M2M or Machine-2-Machine), which are used for the authentication and authorization of systems among themselves or by applications on a system, automated solutions must also be implemented to comply with the permitted usage period for passwords.

Alternatively, if such an automatic mapping of the process for changing the password cannot be implemented, an effective organizational measure must be applied instead, wich ensures a binding manual password change at the end of the permissible period of use.

Motivation: Unlike more modern authentication attributes, passwords are easier to attack. Without specific measures for reliable, technically automated detection of compromises, the risk of a password being discovered or broken by an attacker can increase considerably over time.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-30/8.0

Req 48	If passwords are used as an authentication attribute, they must not be displayed in plain text during input.

Passwords must not be displayed in legible plain text on screens or other output devices while they are entered. A display while entering must not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the characters actually used in the password.

This requirement applies to all types of password input masks and fields.
Examples of this are dialogs for password assignment, password-based login to systems or changing existing passwords.

Exceptions:

- Within an input field, an optional plain text representation of a password is permitted, provided that this plain-text representation serves a valid purpose, exists only temporarily, has to be explicitly activated by the legitimate user on a case-by-case basis and can also be deactivated again immediately by the latter.
  A valid purpose would be, for example, to allow the legitimate user an uncomplicated visual check, if necessary, that he has entered the password correctly in a login dialog before finally completing the login.
  Such an optional plain text representation of a password must remain fully in the control of the legitimate user so that he can decide on its activation/deactivation according to the situation. In the default setting of the system, the plain text representation must be deactivated.
- The typical behavior on many mobile devices (smartphones) of displaying each individual character very briefly in plain text when entering a password - in order to make it easier for the user to control input - is fundamentally permissible there. However, the full password must never be displayed in plain text on the screen.

Motivation: In the case of a plain text display, there is a risk that third parties can randomly or deliberately spy on a password via the screen output while typing.

Implementation example: When displayed on the screen, each individual character is uniformly replaced by a "*" while entering a password.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-31/8.0

9. Logging

Req 49	The system clock must be synchronized to an accurate reference time (Time Standard).

A time reference source must be used which provides a time signal based on the Coordinated Universal Time ("UTC" = "**U**niversal **T**ime **C**oordinated").

Please Note: The UTC-synchronized system time may be transformed to local time using a corresponding timezone configuration setup for any output of time information, as long as this timezone adjustment is fully accountable.

Systems belonging to the same security domain must synchronize to one and the same time reference source.

Motivation: Reference time synchronization may be a technical prerequisite for many time-dependent mechanisms, for example: Validation of Certificates; Authentication. It is also much-needed to generate exact timestamps for logged events, since without the often required time-related correlation in case of a Security Incident or during a Problem Analysis cannot be achieved.

Implementation example: some valid time reference sources:

- trustworthy NTP ("**N**etwork**T**ime**P**rotocol") Server on the IP network
- DCF77 radio signal received via a physically connected receiver
- GPS radio signal received via a physically connected receiver

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-32/8.0

Req 50	Security-relevant events must be logged with a precise time stamp and a unique system reference.

Network elements must log the occurrence of security-relevant events. So that these events can be evaluated and classified, they must be logged together with a unique system reference (e.g., host name, IP or MAC address) and the exact time the event occurred.

When logging, the applicable statutory, collective agreement and operating provisions must be taken into account; these include the statement that the logging of events may only take place for the intended purpose. Logging events in order to exploit these for the control of employees' work is not permitted.

The following security-relevant events must be logged by a network element:

Event	Event data to be logged
Failed login attempts	• Account, • No. of failed attempts, • Source (IP address) of remote access
Changes to configuration	• Change made, • User
Reboot/shutdown/crash	• Action performed (reboot, shutdown, etc.), • User (for intentional actions)
Change to the status of interfaces (e.g., shutdown)	• Interface name and type, • Status (shutdown, missing link, etc.)

Critical rise in system values such as high memory or CPU load over a longer period	• Value exceeded, • Value reached (Here suitable threshold values must be defined depending on the individual system.)
Change to neighbourhood relationships (routing)	• Protocol • IP address of the neighbour
Port security violation (switch)	• Port name • MAC address of the triggering system
Identification of fake BPDU packets in the network (switch)	• Port name • MAC address of the sending system

Suitable thresholds are to be defined depending on the system type and hardware used. Logging of additional security-relevant events may be appropriate. This shall be verified in individual cases and implemented accordingly where required.

Motivation: Logging security-relevant events is a basic requirement for detecting ongoing attacks as well as attacks that have already occurred. This is the only way in which suitable measures can be taken to maintain or restore system security. Furthermore, the logging data is used as evidence so that legal action can be taken against attackers.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.23-50/7.0

Req 51	Applicable retention and deletion periods must be observed for security-relevant logging data that is recorded locally.

From an IT security perspective, local storage of security-relevant logging data on a system is not mandatory. Since the local storage can be damaged in the event of system malfunctions or manipulated by a successful attacker, it can only be used to a limited extent for security-related or forensic analyses. Accordingly, it is relevant for IT security that logging data is forwarded to a separate log server.

Local storage can nevertheless take place; for example, if local storage is initially indispensable when generating the logging data due to technical processes or if there are justified operational interests in also keeping logging data available locally.

The following basic rules must be taken into account when storing logging data locally:

- Security-related logging data must be retained for a period of 90 days.
  (*This requirement only applies if no additional forwarding to a separate log server is implemented on the system and the logging data is therefore only recorded locally.*)
- After 90 days, stored logging data must be deleted immediately.

Deviances

Different retention periods and deletion periods may exist due to legal or regulatory requirements (especially in connection with personal data) or may be defined by contractual agreements. In these cases, the applicable periods must be agreed individually with a Project Security Manager (PSM) / Data Privacy Advisor (DPA) or are specified by them.

Motivation: Logging data is an immensely important IT security tool for preventing, detecting and clearing up system faults, security and data privacy incidents. On the other hand, the recording of logging data, like any other data processing, is also subject to legal and regulatory requirements. Accordingly, guidelines must be adhered to that reconcile the two.

Implementation example: Taking into account the current legal situation and applicable data privacy regulations, the following deletion periods for locally stored security-relevant logging data are implemented on an exemplary telecommunications system:

- Standard System Logs: Deletion after 90 days at the latest
- Logging of public IP addresses: Deletion (or anonymization) after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the assignment of dynamic public IP addresses by the telecommunication solution: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of non-billing-relevant call detail records: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the content of e-mail and SMS: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest
- Logging of the domain queries handled by the DNS server of the telecommunications solution: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-34/8.0

Req 52	Security-relevant logging data must be forwarded to a separate log server immediately after it has been generated.

Logging data must be forwarded to a separate log server immediately after it has been generated. Standardized protocols such as Syslog, SNMPv3 should be preferred.

Motivation: If logging data is only stored locally, it can be manipulated by an attacker who succeeds in compromising the system in order to conceal his attack and any manipulation he has performed on the system. This is the reason why the forwarding must be done immediately after the event occurred.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-35/8.0

Req 53	For security-relevant logging data that is forwarded to the separate log server, compliance with the applicable retention and deletion periods must be ensured.

The following basic rules must be taken into account:

- security-related logging data must be retained for a period of 90 days on the separate log server.
- after 90 days, stored logging data must be deleted immediately on the separate log server.

Deviances

Different retention periods and deletion periods may exist due to legal or regulatory requirements (especially in connection with personal data) or may be defined by contractual agreements. In these cases, the applicable periods must be agreed individually with a Project Security Manager (PSM) / Data Privacy Advisor (DSB) or are specified by them.

Log server under the responsibility of a third party

If the selected separate log server is not within the same operational responsibility as the source system of the loggin data, it must be ensured that the responsible operator of the log server is aware of the valid parameters for the logging

data to be received and that they are adhered to in accordance with the regulations mentioned here.

Motivation: Logging data is an immensely important IT security tool for preventing, detecting and clearing up system faults, security and data privacy incidents. On the other hand, the recording of logging data, like any other data processing, is also subject to legal and regulatory requirements. Accordingly, guidelines must be adhered to that reconcile the two.

Implementation example: Taking into account the current legal situation and applicable data privacy regulations, the following deletion periods for forwarded security-relevant logging data from an exemplary telecommunications system are implemented on the separate log server:

- Standard System Logs: Deletion after 90 days at the latest
- Logging of public IP addresses: Deletion (or anonymization) after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the assignment of dynamic public IP addresses by the telecommunication solution: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of non-billing-relevant call detail records: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the content of e-mail and SMS: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest
- Logging of the domain queries handled by the DNS server of the telecommunications solution: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-36/8.0

Req 54	Security-relevant logging data must be provided to a security incident detection and response solution in near-real-time.

An acceptable detection and response solution for the purposes of this requirement must meet the following criteria:

- There is a continuous analysis and correlation of the logging data provided by connected IT/NT systems.
- The identification of threatening activities and ongoing attacks takes place on the basis of a continuously updated detection pattern database
- Integrated alerting processes trigger the initiation of countermeasures in the event of a find.

Such a solution is not the same as a log server in terms of its function. Accordingly, the provision to a detection and response solution must always be in addition to an existing forwarding to a log server. An exception exists if the log server used provides the logging data to a detection and response solution immediately after receipt. In this case, it is sufficient for the system to forward the logging data only to the log server.
The logging data must be provided to the detection and response solution within 5 minutes ("near-real-time") from the time it is generated in the system.

The specific technical interfaces and protocols to be supported for deployment are determined by the detection and response solution available in the system's operating environment as well as the technical basis of the system itself.

Motivation: IT/NT systems are constantly exposed to security threats and attacks. By means of a central analysis and the correlation of recorded system events of entire IT landscapes in almost real time, current threats and ongoing attacks can be detected even beyond system boundaries and appropriate countermeasures can be initiated promptly. The prompt delivery of logging data to the detection and response solution is essential for its effectiveness.

Implementation example: **Example 1:** A system based on a classic server collects security-relevant logging data in the operating system's local syslog or Windows Event Log. Logging data is continuously forwarded to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) for further analysis, intrusion detection, and alarm handling.

Example 2: An Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agent is running on a system. The EDR agent continuously forwards the security-related logging data it collects on the system to the central backend of the EDR solution, where further analysis, intrusion detection, and alarm handling takes place

Example 3: Systems designed on the basis of cloud-native functions generate logging data directly from these functions using the cloud's own logging and monitoring infrastructure. In such a system, the generation of security-relevant logging data is specifically activated in the corresponding configuration options of the cloud-native functions used. The resulting logging data is continuously transferred to a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) for further analysis, intrusion detection and alarm handling. Some cloud providers already provide some attack pattern detection in the cloud's own monitoring infrastructure and generate specific cloud alerts from it. These are also transferred to the SIEM.

Example 4: A system is based on a SaaS ("Software as a Service") application from a cloud provider. Typically, in the SaaS model, the cloud provider is responsible for all operational aspects of the application, including security management. The cloud customer itself has no influence on the underlying technical infrastructure or the operation of the application. Based on contractual agreements, recognized certificates, and documented self-disclosures from the cloud provider, it is formally verified that the cloud provider has implemented a security incident detection and response solution. Some cloud providers also generate dedicated logging data about security-relevant activities within the separate customer tenants of their SaaS application (e.g. changes to configuration settings, permission assignments or user accounts within the tenants) and make them available to cloud customers. These so-called audit logs are continuously transferred to a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) for further analysis, attack detection and alarm handling.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-37/8.0

10. Layer 2 protocols

Req 55	VLAN 1 must not be used.

VLAN 1 is the default VLAN at some manufacturers. This VLAN cannot be deleted or disabled and is automatically assigned to all interfaces which are not mapped to another VLAN. VLAN 1 shall not be used. In addition, VLAN 1 shall not be enabled on trunks.

Motivation: If VLAN 1 is used, an improper configuration may result in a system not intended for this inadvertently gaining access to systems and data in this VLAN as it is automatically mapped to this VLAN. This can become particularly problematic if VLAN 1 is used, for example, to manage the switch.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

ID: 3.23-55/7.0

10.1. Trunk

Req 56	A native VLAN must be configured for trunk ports.

In the IEEE 802.1q standard, the packets of the native VLAN are transmitted without tagging. Packets which do not belong to a VLAN due to lack of tagging are mapped to the native VLAN. For this reason, the native VLAN may only be configured on trunks for the transmission of management information between network devices which are connected via this trunk. VLAN 1 shall not be used as a native VLAN. Its use for the transmission of user data is not permitted. Please note that the same VLAN shall be used as “native” on both systems of a trunk.

Motivation: When using the native VLAN for data communication, it may be possible to overcome the logical separation of VLANs using VLAN hopping attacks and thus feed data into a VLAN without authorization.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

ID: 3.23-56/7.0

Req 57	When using VTP, the partners involved must authenticate each other.

The Virtual Trunking Protocol (VTP) is used for automatic dissemination of VLAN information between network elements. In order to prevent any tampering with the VLAN configuration, VTP should be disabled. If VTP is to be used, the parties involved must authenticate each other.

Motivation: An attacker can use the VTP protocol to tamper with the trunk and VLAN configuration of a network element's port in order to gain unauthorized access to VLANs.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

ID: 3.23-57/7.0

10.2. Access ports

Req 58	The private VLAN function must be enabled on access ports.

The private VLAN function prevents direct communication between devices which are connected to a switch. As a result, this function should be enabled (in isolated mode) on access ports. It is possible to ignore this requirement is a communication between systems ist needed.

The private VLAN function may not be enabled on trunks and uplinks. Private VLANs represent protection on OSI layer 2 only. As a result, it may be possible to bypass this protection on OSI layer 3. A check should therefore be performed in each case to establish whether additional measures to safeguard communication between devices needs to be implemented on layer 3.

Motivation: Communication between the systems that are connected to a switch can be prevented on layer 2 by means of the private VLAN function. As a result, attacks on other systems and the recording of data traffic can be prevented to a large extent.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

ID: 3.23-58/7.0

Req 59	Access ports must not be configured as trunks.

Trunks are used to exchange data of multiple VLANs between network elements. The individual VLANs are marked and differentiated through tagging. Access ports to devices may not be configured as trunks. Systems such as servers with which data from multiple VLANs is to be exchanged explicitly are excluded from this.

Motivation: An attacker who can connect to a trunk port can access all VLANs that are accessible via this trunk and reach systems in these VLANs in order to attack them.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

ID: 3.23-59/7.0

Req 60	DTP must be disabled on access ports.

DTP (Dynamic Trunking Protocol) offers the opportunity to negotiate the trunk status between two network elements that are connected to each other. This protocol must be disabled on access ports. Devices such as servers with which data from multiple VLANs is to be exchanged explicitly are excluded from this.

Motivation: An attacker who is connected to a port and is active on the DTP can use the protocol to configure the port as a trunk and thus possibly gain unauthorized access to VLANs.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.23-60/7.0

Req 61	Protection against fake BPDUs must be used on access ports.

The Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is a layer-2 protocol that is to prevent endless loops in networks. Endless loops can arise in redundant network paths. A "root bridge" is defined using BPDU (Bridge Protocol Data Units) packets and on the basis of a bridge ID. Since there is no authentication in the STP, an attacker can influence the selection of the root bridge. In order to prevent such attacks, protection against fake BPDUs, such as BPDU Guard, Root Guard or similar access lists must be enabled.

Motivation: Using fake BPDU packets, an attacker can take up the position of the "root bridge" in order to divert data traffic via himself.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

ID: 3.23-61/7.0

Req 62	Port security must be enabled on access ports.

Port security should be enabled on access ports to devices. This requirement is especially for access ports used to connect devices like workstations and printers etc. The requirement can be ignored for ports used to connect servers

This function ensures that only legitimate systems whose MAC address is released for access can connect to the network. If a system with an unknown MAC address is connected to the port, the port should be permanently blocked until it is manually unblocked by an administrator. In the configuration less as possible MAC addresses sshould be allowed. Furthermore security is higher with static MAC addresses than with learned MAC addresses. In single cases it can be necessary to learn the MAC address when a device is connected for the first time. In this cases it must be ensured that this function can not be used abusive.

Motivation: Enabling port security helps to prevent illegitimate systems from being connected to the network. Port security also constitutes effective protection against attacks such as:

- *CAM table flooding – With this attack, an overflow of the MAC table (CAM table) and possibly a crash of the switch concerned is provoked through manipulated ARP packets with fake MAC addresses..*
- *DHCP starvation attack – With this attack, all DHCP leases are used up with the help of fake MAC addresses. The aim of this attack is that no further IP addresses are available to connect additional systems.~*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system

ID: 3.23-62/7.0