Security requirement

# Third Party Access

Deutsche Telekom Group

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Summary
Everyday requirements for companies of the Deutsche Telekom Group include granting third parties access to internal IT/NT systems. Access scenarios range from simple Internet access through to sessions with interactive notifications, depending on the target system and required activity. Securing and monitoring these connections is critical to success in maintaining an appropriate protection level for IT/NT systems and data. The following document describes the relevant security requirements for access by third parties.

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. General Note

This security document has been prepared based on the general security policies of the group.
The security requirement is used as a basis for an approval in the PSA process, among other things. It also serves as an implementation standard for units which do not participate in the PSA process. These requirements shall be taken into account from the very beginning, including during the planning and decision-making processes.
When implementing these security requirements, the precedence of national, international and supranational law shall be observed.

## 1.2. Scenarios

There are a number of reasons why third parties access the Deutsche Telekom Group's internal IT/NT systems. In some cases, third parties only access applications of the Deutsche Telekom Group or provide content. In other cases, third parties develop applications or provide support for production systems using privileged authorizations. It is of central importance to protect the assets of the Deutsche Telekom Group in accordance with the various access levels and authorizations. This document deals with eight different categories of interface for third parties.

| Scenario | Description |
|---|---|
| Application use | User access to applications in networks of the Deutsche Telekom Group |
| Application development | Software development in environments operated by the Deutsche Telekom Group |
| Testing | Testing of IT systems in environments operated by the Deutsche Telekom Group |
| Production support/maintenance | IT system/software/hardware support/operation for/of production systems |
| Operation | Operation of systems |
| Monitoring | Hardware/software monitoring of internal systems |
| Business-to-business content | B2B interfaces with content providers |
| Business-to-business service | Generic B2B interfaces (file/data transfer, etc.) |

Table 1 – Interface categories for third party access

# 2. Technical Requirements

## 2.1. Architecture

| Req 1 | All connections must be terminated in a DMZ. |
|---|---|

There must be no direct connection between a third party (3P) and a target system or vice versa.
An access platform for third parties in a DMZ (3rd party access platform, 3PAP) must have the functions necessary for fulfilling the security requirements. The 3PAP must always be provided by the Deutsche Telekom Group.

*Motivation: There must be an effective control point for implementing the security requirements.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.20-1/7.0

| Req 2 | The network segregation of the 3PAP and adjacent services must follow their different functional elements. |
|---|---|

The individual functional elements must be contained in different (V)LANs protected by a firewall gateway.

*Motivation: Attacks targeted at a specific functional element remain restricted to its security zone (implemented via a (V)LAN).*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.20-2/7.0

| Req 3 | The 3PAP must be protected by stateful firewall gateways. |
|---|---|

*Motivation: State-of-the-art network layer protective mechanisms contribute to the overall security of the 3PAP.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.20-3/7.0

| Req 4 | Only visual presentation protocols such as RDP, ICA or RFB (with regard to third parties) must be permitted by the 3PAP. |
|---|---|

Application protocols must not be directly available. This means that applications must run within the visual presenta-

tion window. This can be achieved using, for example, Windows Terminal Services, Citrix Metaframe, VNC or Oracle Secure Global Desktop.
In the case of hardware/software monitoring of internal systems or B2B interfaces, visual presentation protocols can be dispensed with.

**This requirement is only applicable in the following scenarios:**

- Application use: User access to applications in networks of the Deutsche Telekom Group
- Operation: Operation of systems
- Production support/maintenance: IT system/software/hardware support/maintenance for production systems
- Application development: Software development in environments operated by the Deutsche Telekom Group
- Testing: Testing of IT systems in environments operated by the Deutsche Telekom Group

*Motivation: The visual presentation constitutes an abstraction layer which protects the integrity of the client software and its environment.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

ID: 3.20-4/7.0

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|---|---|
| Req 5 | Connections with command line protocols must be protected using an application layer proxy. |

In certain scenarios, a command line protocol must be used between the third party and the 3PAP instead of the graphic representation. In such a case, the connection must be protected by an application layer proxy for the relevant protocol. The application layer proxy must provide required security enforcement features. This is the basis for fulfilling all further requirements for the third party access.

*Motivation: A holistic protection can only be achieved by controlling all access channels.*

Implementation example: Use of the BalaBit Shell Control Box (non-transparent and bastion mode).

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.20-5/7.0

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| Req 6 | The Deutsche Telekom Group must be able to explicitly control the content of monitoring connections. |

The required monitoring level must cover transparency (at a defined point) and the ability to configure the transmitted information. The third party must not be able to change this information without prior approval from the Deutsche Telekom Group.

**This requirement is only applicable in the following scenarios:**

- Monitoring: Hardware/software monitoring of internal systems

*Motivation: This prevents gaps in information protection.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.20-6/7.0

## 2.2. Technical and organizational requirements for the use of components in the system

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| Req 7 | Software and hardware of the system must be covered by security vulnerability support from the supplier. |

Only software and hardware products for which there is security vulnerability support by the supplier may be used in a system.
Such support must include that the supplier

- continuously monitors and analyzes the product for whether it has been affected by security vulnerabilities,
- informs immediately about the type, severity and exploitability of vulnerabilities discovered in the product
- timely provides product updates or effective workarounds to remedy the vulnerabilities.

The security vulnerability support must be in place for the entire period in which the affected product remains in use.

**Support phases with limited scope of services**
Many suppliers optionally offer time-extended support for their products, which goes beyond the support phase intended for the general market, but is often associated with limitations. Some suppliers define their support fundamentally in increments, which may include limitations even during the final phase before the absolute end date of regular support.
If a product is used within support phases that are subject to limitations, it must be explicitly ensured that these restrictions do not affect the availability of security vulnerability support.

**Open Source Software and Hardware**
Open Source products are often developed by free organizations or communities; accordingly, contractually agreed security vulnerability support may not be available. In principle, it must also be ensured here that the organization/community (or a third party officially commissioned by them) operates a comprehensive security vulnerability management for the affected product, which meets the above-mentioned criteria and is considered to be reliably established.

*Motivation: Hardware and software products for which there is no comprehensive security vulnerability support from the supplier pose a risk. This means that a product is not adequately checked to determine whether it is affected by further developed forms of attack or newly discovered vulnerabilities in technical implementations. Likewise, if there are existing security vulnerabilities in a product, no improvements (e.g. updates, patches) are provided. This results in a system whose weak points cannot be remedied, so that they remain exploitable by an attacker in order to compromise the system or to adversely affect it.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-1/8.0

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| Req 8 | The software used must be obtained from trusted sources and checked for integrity. |

The software used on the system must be obtained from trusted sources and checked for integrity before installation.
This requirement applies to all types of software:

- Firmware and microcode for hardware components

- Operating systems
- Software Libraries
- Application Software
- Pre-integrated application solutions, such as software appliances or containers

as well as other software that may be used.

### Trusted Sources

Trusted sources are generally considered to be:

- the official distribution and supply channels of the supplier
- third party distributors, provided they are authorized by the supplier and are a legitimate part of the supplier´s delivery channels
- internet downloads, if they are made from official provisioning servers of the supplier or authorized distributors
  (1) If the provisioning server offers various forms of downloads, those protected by encryption or cryptographic signatures must be preferred to those without such protection.
  (2) If the provisioning server secures the transport layer using cryptographic protocols (e.g. HTTPS, sftp), the associated server certificates or server keys/fingerprints must be validated with each download to confirm the identity of the provisioning server; if validation fails, the download must be cancelled and the provisioning server has to be considered an untrusted source.

### Integrity Check

The integrity check is intended to ensure that the received software is free of manipulation and malware infection. If available, the mechanisms implemented by the supplier must be used for checking.
Valid mechanisms are:

- physical seals or permanently applied certificates of authenticity (if the software is provided on physical media)
- comparison of cryptographic hash values (e.g. SHA256, SHA512) of the received software against target values, which the supplier provides separately
- verification of cryptographic signatures (e.g. GPG, certificates) with which the supplier provides its software

In addition, a check of the software using an anti-virus or anti-malware scanner is recommended (if the vendor has not implemented any of the aforementioned integrity protection mechanisms for its software, this verification is mandatory).

### Extended integrity checking when pulling software from public registries

Public registries allow developers to make any of their own software projects available for use. The range includes projects from well-known companies with controlled development processes, as well as from smaller providers or amateur developers.
Examples of such registries are:

- Code registries (e.g. GitHub, Bitbucket, SourceForge, Python Package Index)
- Container registries (e.g. Docker Hub)

Software from public registries must undergo an extended integrity check before deployment.
In addition to the integrity check components described in the previous section, the extended check is intended to explicitly ensure that the software actually performs its function as described, does not contain inherent security risks such as intentionally implemented malware features, and is not affected by known security vulnerabilities. If the software has direct dependencies on third-party software projects (dependencies are very typical in open source software), which must also be obtained and installed for the use of the software, these must be included in the extended integrity check.

Methods for an extended integrity check can be, for example:

- Strict validation of project/package names (avoidance of confusion with deliberately imitated malicious software projects)
- dynamic code analysis / structured functional checks in a test environment

- static code analysis using a linter (e.g. Splint, JSLint, pylint)
- Examination using a security vulnerability scanner (e.g. Qualys, Nessus)
- Examination using a container security scanner (e.g. JFrog Xray, Harbor, Clair, Docker Scan)
- Examination using an SCA (Software Composition Analysis) tool or dependency scanner (e.g. OWASP Dependency Check, Snyk)

The test methods must be selected and appropriately combined according to the exact form of software delivery (source code, binaries/artifacts, containers).

*Motivation: Software supply chains contain various attack vectors. An attacker can start at various points to manipulate software or introduce his own routines and damage or control the target environment in which the software is subsequently used. The attack can occur on the transport or transmission path or on the provisioning source itself. Accordingly, an attack is facilitated if software is not obtained from official and controlled sources or if an integrity check is omitted.*
*There is a particular risk for software obtained from public registries, as these are open to anyone for the provision of software projects. Perfidious attack methods are known, in which the attacker first provides completely inconspicuous, functional software for a while and as soon as it has established itself and found a certain spread, deliberately hidden malicious code is integrated in future versions. Other methods rely on similar-sounding project names for widely used existing projects or overruling version numbers to inject manipulated software into any solutions based on them.*

Implementation example: Obtain the software via the official delivery channels of the supplier. Upon receipt of the software, immediately check for integrity using cryptographic checksums, as provided by the supplier, as well as scan for any infections by known malware using anti-malware / anti-virus scanners. Storage of the tested software on an internal, protected file storage and further use (e.g. rollout to the target systems) only from there.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-2/8.0

## 2.3. Basic System Hardening

| Req 9 | Only required software may be used on the system. |
|---|---|

In the installation routines for software provided by the supplier, individual components of the software are often preselected as standard installations, which are not necessary for the operation and function of a specific system. This also includes parts of software that are installed as application examples (e.g. default web pages, sample databases, test data), but are typically not used afterwards.

Such components must be specifically deselected (not installed) during the installation of the system or - if deselection during installation is not possible - removed immediately afterwards.

In principle, no software may be used that is not required for the operation, maintenance or function of the system.

*Motivation: Vulnerabilities in a system's software are gateways for attackers. By uninstalling unnecessary components, the potential attack surfaces can be significantly reduced.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-3/8.0

| Req 10 | Features that are not required in the software and hardware used must be deactivated. |
|---|---|

During the initial installation of software, features may have been activated by default that are not necessary for the operation and functionality of the specific system. Features are usually an integral part of the software that cannot be deleted or uninstalled individually.

Such features must be disabled immediately after the initial installation through the software's configuration settings, so that they remain permanently disabled even after the system is rebooted.

Even before delivery or during initial commissioning, features may have been activated by default in the hardware that are not required for the purpose of the specific system. Such functions, for example unnecessary interfaces, must also be permanently deactivated immediately after initial commissioning.

*Motivation: A system's hardware or software often contains enabled features that are not being used. Such features can be an unnecessary target for manipulation. Furthermore, there is a potential that unauthorized access to areas or data of the system can be created.*

Implementation example: [Example 1]
Deactivation of debugging functions in the software that are used in the event of fault analysis, but do not have to be active during normal operation.

[Example 2]
Disabling unused network interfaces of a server.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-4/8.0

| Req 11 | Unnecessary services must be disabled. |
|---|---|

After the installation of systems and software products, supplier-preset, local or network-accessible services are often active that are not required for the operation and functionality of the specific system in the intended operating environment.

However, in principle only the services actually required may be active on a system.

Accordingly, all services that are not required on a system must be completely disabled immediately after installation. It must be ensured that these services remain disabled even after the system is restarted.

*Motivation: Active services that are not required unnecessarily increase the attack surface of a system and, as a direct consequence, the risk of a successful compromise. This risk can be further increased if - as is often observed with services that are not required - a targeted examination and optimization of the configuration with regard to security does not take place sufficiently.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-5/8.0

| Req 12 | The accessibility of activated services must be restricted. |
|---|---|

In principle, a service provided must be completely deactivated on all interfaces of the system through which accessibility of the service is not required for the proper operation of the system. The deactivation is primarily to be implemented by a corresponding configuration of the service or operating system. In cases where the available configuration options do not allow deactivation on individual interfaces, a local filter ("Host Firewall") may instead be used on the system to block access to the service via unnecessary interfaces.

The accessibility of a service via the required interfaces must also be restricted to legitimate communication partners.

The restriction must be implemented by a corresponding configuration of the service or operating system or by means of a local filter ("Host Firewall"). Alternatively, this task may be outsourced to a network-side filter element, provided that the system is located in a separate network segment and communication with this segment is only possible via the network-side filter element.

*Motivation: By deactivating services on interfaces through which accessibility is not necessary, as well as by restricting possible communication partners, the attack surface offered by a system can be greatly reduced.*

Implementation example: An SNMP service used to monitor a system is enabled exclusively on the dedicated management network interface of the system. A firewall also regulates that only the legitimate monitoring system of the infrastructure environment can reach this service.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-6/8.0

| Req 13 | Predefined user accounts that are not required must be deleted or at least disabled. |
|---|---|

On many systems, there are predefined but unused user accounts (e.g. "guest") after the initial installation.

These predefined user accounts must be deleted or at least disabled immedately after the initial installation; if these measures are not feasible, the corresponding user accounts must be blocked for remote access. In any case, disabled or blocked user accounts must also be provided with an authentication attribute (e.g. a password or an SSH key) so that unauthorized use of such a user account is prevented in the event of a misconfiguration.

Excempt from the requirement to delete or disable predefined user accounts are user accounts that are used exclusively for internal use on the corresponding system and that are required for the functionality of one or more applications of the system. Even for such a user account, it must be ensured that remote access or local login is not possible and that a user of the system cannot misuse such a user account.

*Motivation: User accounts that are predefined by default in a product are typically common knowledge and can be targeted by an attacker for brute force and dictionary attacks. If these user accounts are not needed in a specific system, their existence represents an unnecessary attack surface. A particular risk is posed by predefined user accounts that are preconfigured without a password or with a well-known standard password. Such user accounts can be misused directly by an attacker if their security hardening was missed due to the unplanned use in the specific system.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-7/8.0

| Req 14 | Predefined authentication attributes must be changed. |
|---|---|

After the takeover or initial installation of a system, there are usually predefined authentication attributes (e.g. passwords, SSH keys, SSL/TLS Certificates) in the system, as assigned by manufacturers, developers, suppliers or automated installation routines.

Such predefined authentication attributes must be changed to new, individual values immediately after the takeover or installation of the system.

*Motivation: Values predefined by third parties in authentication attributes cannot be trusted because they do not represent a controlled secret. Affected authentication attributes can be misused by unauthorized persons to access and compromise systems. This risk is significantly increased if commonly known default values are used for authentication attributes (e.g. a default password for the administrator user account in a particular software product).*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-8/8.0

| Req 15 | Outputs and messages must not disclose information on internal structures of the system. |
|---|---|

Information about the internal structures of a system, including the components used there, and corresponding implementation details are generally considered to be in need of protection.

In general, this concerns information on

- Product names and product identifiers of implemented system components
- Operating systems, middleware, backend software, software libraries and internal applications as well as their software versions
- installed service packs, patches, hotfixes
- Serial numbers of components as well as stored product licenses
- Database Structures

Typical examples of outputs and messages in which disclosure of such system information can potentially occur:

- Login windows and dialogs
- Error messages
- Status messages
- Banners of active network services
- System logs and log files
- Debug logs, stack traces

As far as it is technically feasible without impairing the function and operation of the system, the output of affected system information must always be deactivated.

Access to affected system information must only be possible for authorized users of the system. As a rule, this circle of authorized users is to be limited to administrators and operators of the system. Access for authorized monitoring and inventory systems within the operating environment is also permitted.

A permissible exception to these restrictions exists for specific individual system information, the disclosure of which is technically mandatory for the intended function of the system in conjunction with third-party systems; For example, the presentation of supported protocols and their versions during the initial parameter negotiation in session setups between a client and a server.

*Motivation: Information about the internal structures of a system can be used by an attacker to prepare attacks on the system extremely effective. For example, an attacker can derive any known vulnerabilities of a product from the software version in order to exploit them specifically during the attack on the system.*

Implementation example: [Example 1]
Deactivation of the display of the product name and the installed version of a Web server in its delivered error web pages.

[Example 2]
Removal of the product name and the corresponding version string from the login banner of a deployed SSH server.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-9/8.0

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| Req 16 | Known vulnerabilities in the software or hardware of the system must be fixed or protected against misuse. |

Known vulnerabilities in software and hardware components must be fixed by installing available system updates from the supplier (e.g. patches, updates/upgrades). Alternatively, the use of workarounds (acute solutions that do not fix the vulnerability, but effectively prevent exploitation) is permissible. Workarounds should only be used temporarily and should be replaced by a regular system update as soon as possible in order to completely close the vulnerabilities.

Components that contain known, unrecoverable vulnerabilities must not be used in a system.

The treatment of newly discovered vulnerabilities must also be continuously ensured for the entire deployment phase of the system and implemented in the continuous operating processes of security patch management.

*Motivation: The use of components without fixing contained vulnerabilities significantly increases the risk of a successful compromise. The attacker is additionally favored by the fact that, as a rule, not only detailed information on vulnerabilities that have already become known is openly available, but often also already adapted attack tools that facilitate active exploitation.*

Implementation example: Following the initial installation of an operating system from an official installation medium, all currently available patches and security updates are installed.

Additional information:
The primary sources of known vulnerabilities in software/hardware are lists in the release notes as well as the security advisories from the official reporting channels of the supplier or independent CERTs. In particular, the reporting channels are sensibly integrated into continuous processes of security patch management for a system, so that newly discovered vulnerabilities can be registered promptly and led into operational remedial measures.
As a complementary measure to the detection of potentially still contained types of vulnerabilities that have in principle already become known, targeted vulnerability investigations of the system can be carried out. Particularly specialized tools such as automated vulnerability scanners are suitable for this purpose. Examples include: Tenable Nessus, Qualys Scanner Appliance.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-10/8.0

## 2.4. Protecting availability and integrity

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|---|---|
| Req 17 | The system must be implemented robustly against unexpected inputs. |

Data transferred to the system must first be validated before further processing to ensure that the data corresponds to the expected data type and format. This is intended to eliminate the risk of manipulation of system processes and states by appropriately constructed data content. Validation must be carried out for any data that is transferred to the system. Examples include user input, values in data fields, and log contents.

The following typical implementation mistakes must be avoided:

- lack of validation of the length of passed data
- Incorrect assumptions about the format of data

- lack of validation of received data for conformity with the specification
- Inadequate handling of protocol deviations in received data
- Insufficient limitation of recursion when parsing complex data formats
- Insufficient implementation of whitelisting or escaping to protect against inputs outside the valid value range

*Motivation: An attacker can use specifically engineered data content to try to put a system that does not sufficiently validate received data before internal processing into an unstable state or to trigger unauthorized actions within the system. The damage potential of such attacks depends on the individual system, but has a theoretical range from uncontrolled system crashes to a controlled execution of specially injected code and the resulting complete compromise of a system.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-11/8.0

| Req 18 | The system must be protected against overload situations. |
|---|---|

A system must have protective mechanisms that prevent overload situations as far as possible.
In particular, a partial or complete impairment of the availability of the system must be avoided.

Examples of possible protective measures are:
- Limiting the amount of memory (RAM) available per application
- Limiting the maximum sessions of a web application
- Limiting the maximum size of a dataset
- Limiting CPU resources per process
- Prioritizing processes
- Limiting the number or size of transactions by a user or from an IP address over time

Note:
A system can usually not protect itself against network-based attacks with extremely high data or packet rates, the so-called "Distributed Denial of Service" (DDoS) attacks. To defend against DDoS attacks, an upstream solution in the network layer is required.

*Motivation: Attackers can try to use up the resources of a system with targeted resource-intensive or large-volume requests, so that the system can no longer fulfill its regular tasks or intended task volumes and the availability of the services offered is effectively disrupted. Limiting the maximum resources that can be used per request made to the system is a fundamental measure to reduce the impact of such denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.01-12/8.0

| Req 19 | In overload situations, the system must behave in a predictable manner. |
|---|---|

Even comprehensive native protections may not be able to prevent a system from becoming overloaded in extreme situations.

It must therefore be ensured that, in overload situations, the system does not switch to a state that overrides security-relevant functions or properties of the system. Performance losses (e.g. the reduction of the throughput of legitimate network packets or the number of answered server requests per period) are usually unavoidable in overload situations, but the regular functional behavior of the system must be fundamentally preserved.

In extreme cases, this can mean that a controlled shutdown of the system is more acceptable than continued operation in the event of uncontrolled failure of the security functions and thus the loss of system protection.

*Motivation: By means of a denial-of-service attack, an attacker can try to overload a system in a targeted manner. If such a system then reacts unpredictably or fails its regular behavior, especially with regard to its security functions, this can open up an extended attack surface for the attacker on functions and data of the system and potentially endanger other linked systems.*

Implementation example: A firewall that discards its filter rules in overload situations and forwards all packets without checking would not meet the requirement. In this case, blocking all packets by shutting down the firewall would be more acceptable than failing their regular task of protecting downstream systems.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-13/8.0

## 2.5. Protecting data and information

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|---|---|
| Req 20 | Stored data in need of protection must be protected against unauthorized access, modification and deletion. |

The need for protection of stored data depends on its classification (e.g. according to applicable legal data privacy requirements, regulatory requirements, contractual obligations), the potential damage in the event of its misuse, and other relevant factors (e.g. the location of storage). The nature and extent of protective measures must be appropriately chosen.
Stored authentication attributes such as passwords, private keys, tokens or certificates etc. are generally considered to be in need of protection. Data that determines the functionality and security-relevant behavior of a system (e.g. system configuration files, operating systems and kernels, drivers) are also considered to be fundamentally in need of protection.

Compliance with the protection objectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability must be consistently guaranteed for stored data in need of protection. This also applies during only short-term storage (e.g. when storing in a web cache or in a temporary folder within a data processing chain).

Basically, access to data in need of protection in a system must be fully regulated on the basis of technically implemented authorization assignments and controls.
If such technical access control alone is no longer sufficient to ensure the necessary protection requirements of stored data, or if its effectiveness cannot be consistently ensured, additional cryptographic methods (e.g. encryption, signing, hashing) must be implemented. Cryptographic methods used for the storage of data must be recognised and effective for this purpose and must not have any known vulnerabilities.

*Motivation: The storage of data on a system without adequate protection enables an attacker to view, use, disseminate, modify or destroy it without authorization. This potentially opens up additional attack vectors on the immediate and connected other systems and can lead to significant failures, loss of control and damage as well as resulting penalties and loss of reputation towards customers and business partners.*

Implementation example: [Example 1]
A system exports data for transport to mobile media. Since the system's technical access control at the file permission level no longer applies as soon as the mobile media is removed from the system, additional measures must be taken to protect the data. Before the system writes the data to the mobile media, it is encrypted accordingly using a suitable algorithm. The associated encryption key is exchanged on a separate channel so that the data can be decrypted and

processed again in the legitimate target system. An attacker who takes possession of the mobile media, on the other hand, has no access to the data.

[Example 2]
Only cryptographic hashes of passwords generated with a secure password hashing method are stored in the local user database of a system. For the system, these hashes are sufficient to authenticate users when they log on to the system. However, if an attacker can copy the user database, he does not immediately come into possession of plaintext passwords with which he could log on to the system on behalf of the users.

[Example 3]
On a system, the configuration files of the Web server can only be written by the legitimate admin in which corresponding permissions have been set in the file system. The access control of the operating system kernel thus denies all other users of the system to make changes to the configuration files of the web server; including the web server service account itself, which also reduces the attack surface from the outside in case of vulnerabilities in the web server.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Disruption of availability
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-14/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 21 | Data in need of protection must be protected against unauthorized access and modification during transmission. |

The need for protection of data to be transmitted depends on its classification (e.g. according to applicable legal data privacy requirements, regulatory requirements, contractual obligations), the potential damage in the event of its misuse, and other relevant factors (e.g. transmission via public networks). The nature and extent of the protective measures must be appropriately chosen.
Authentication attributes such as passwords or tokens etc. are generally considered to be in need of protection. Data that determines the functionality and security-relevant behavior of a system (e.g. updates & patches, configuration parameters, remote maintenance, control via APIs) are also considered to be fundamentally in need of protection.

Compliance with the protection objectives of confidentiality and integrity must be consistently guaranteed during the transmission of data in need of protection.

As a rule, this requires the implementation of cryptographic methods (e.g. encryption, signatures, Hashes).
Cryptographic methods may

- be applied directly to the data before transmission, which can make subsequent transmission acceptable even via insecure channels
- be used on the transmission channel to create a secure channel and protect any kind of data passing through it
- or be implemented as a combination of both.

Cryptographic methods used for the transmission of data must be recognized and effective for this purpose and must have no known vulnerabilities.

*Motivation: The transmission of data without adequate protection enables an attacker to intercept, use, disseminate, modify or remove it from transmission without authorization. This potentially opens up further attack vectors on the immediate target systems as well as connected other systems and can lead to significant failures, loss of control and damage as well as resulting penalty claims and reputational losses towards customers and business partners.*

Implementation example: [Example 1]
Confidential documents are encrypted before they are sent by e-mail to the customer.

[Example 2]
An administrator configures a new cloud application over the Internet. Access is via a TLS-encrypted connection

("https").

[Example 3]
A system obtains automatic software updates from an update server. The update server delivers the software updates cryptographically signed. The system can thus validate the received software updates and reliably rule out that they have been manipulated during transmission.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Disruption of availability
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-15/8.0

| Req 22 | Only secure protocols must be used for communication via business interfaces. |
|---|---|

Machine-to-machine connections are understood to include B2B interfaces.
Sufficiently secure protocols include, for example, SSL/TLS envelopes, SFTP, SNC.

**This requirement is only applicable in the following scenarios:**

- Monitoring: Hardware/software monitoring of internal systems
- Business-to-business content: B2B interfaces with content providers
- Business-to-business service: Generic B2B interfaces (file/data transfer, etc.)

*Motivation: There are many B2B communication protocols; security functions must be an integral part of these protocols (generally in the form of authentication, encryption and integrity protection).*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

ID: 3.20-22/7.0

| Req 23 | The system must check every file exchange processed via the 3PAP using a malware scanner. |
|---|---|

*Motivation: Such a review shall prevent the infiltration of malware in both directions.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability

ID: 3.20-23/7.0

## 2.6. Session Protection

| Req 24 | Sessions must be protected against unauthorized takeover ("session hijacking"). |
|---|---|

Interfaces that provide session functionality to the system must implement technical measures to prevent a legitimate user's session from being taken over and continued by an unauthorized third party.

Such protection can be achieved, for example, by implementing a combination of the following options that makes sense for the specific system:

- At the transport layer: Use of the TCP protocol (with its sequence numbers) and corresponding filter lists
- At the session layer: Use of the TLS Protocol
- At the application layer: Negotiation of a random secret session key between sender and receiver to authorize all session traffic (e.g. session ID, session cookie, session token)
- Use of cryptographic methods to protect session keys from eavesdropping or modification attacks

*Motivation: Unprotected sessions can potentially be hijacked and continued by an attacker in order to exercise unauthorized access to the system in the context of the affected user.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-16/8.0

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|---|---|
| Req 25 | The system must allow users to log out of their current session. |

The system must have a feature that enables the logged-in user to log out at any time. It must not be possible to resume a logged-out session without re-authenticating the user.

*Motivation: A user must retain complete control over the sessions he has established in order to be able to terminate his access to a system at any time according to the situation and thus protect data and functions exposed via this access. In addition, the user must be able to assume that sessions specifically terminated by him cannot subsequently be resumed and continued by unauthorized third parties.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-17/8.0

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|---|---|
| Req 26 | If no activity is detected on a user/business interface for a specific period, the relevant session must close automatically. |

According to expectations, a typical timeout period for a session is less than an hour.

*Motivation: Inactive sessions are at risk of being hijacked or misused.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data

ID: 3.20-26/7.0

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|---|---|
| Req 27 | Access to production systems must only be enabled on a temporary basis and must be based on an individual incident or support case. |

The 3PAP is generally the entity that technically implements the temporary character of this type of access. Privileged access rights can cover administrative levels.

**This requirement is only applicable in the following scenario:**

- Production support/maintenance: IT system/software/hardware support/maintenance for/of production systems

*Motivation: In this scenario, production systems are subject to high security risks. Access restrictions must therefore be as strict as possible.*

Implementation example: Access is based on tickets, which only enable sessions for a limited time on certain systems. Employees of the Deutsche Telekom Group generate the tickets with a period of validity assessed case by case. Oracle Secure Global Desktop is an example of a solution that can provide relevant functions in compliance with the rules.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system

ID: 3.20-27/7.0

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|---|---|
| Req 28 | A 3P session must be limited to a fixed time window. |

If necessary, the time frame can be extended in a controlled way. According to expectations, typical time frames are less than 12 hours.

*Motivation: Limited time frames minimize the attack surface.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data

ID: 3.20-28/7.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 29 | An employee of the Deutsche Telekom Group must be able to close a 3P session at any time. |

*Motivation: The operational controls shall always remain with the Deutsche Telekom Group.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system

ID: 3.20-29/7.0

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|---|---|
| Req 30 | Specified connection rules must define all permitted connections from the third party to the 3PAP and from the 3PAP to the target system(s) (individually for 3P units and 3P user/business interfaces). |

The connection rules are configured using configuration service programs. The connection rules restrict the possible connections between 3P, 3PAP and the target system(s).

*Motivation: It is important to limit 3P interactions in accordance with the need-to-know principle.*

Implementation example: Connection rules are usually a combination of definitions on various devices of the 3PAP and a surrounding firewall gateway.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system

ID: 3.20-30/7.0

## 2.7. Recording of 3PAP Sessions

| Req 31 | The session log must contain defined parameters for successful access attempts to the 3PAP. |
|---|---|

These are the defined parameters:

1. Date, timezone and time of session initiation and session termination
2. Source object (3P) name
3. Source object (3P) IP address
4. 3P account name (user)/ID of business interface
5. Destination object (target system/application) name and IP address
6. Destination service name and TCP port
7. Action (session established/session request rejected)

For correct date and time information, all logging systems for a service must be connected to a time synchronization mechanism.

*Motivation: In the event of security incidents, audit trails provide important information.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.20-31/7.0

| Req 32 | Production support sessions must be recorded consistently. |
|---|---|

Recording means capturing the visual content and/or text content of a support session, including all meta data and transmitted files (binary recording). The result is generally a film that shows the session in real time with all 3P interactions, and copies of the transmitted files.

**This requirement is only applicable in the following scenarios:**

- Production support/maintenance: IT system/software/hardware support/maintenance for/of production systems

*Motivation: Due to their critical importance, a detailed audit trail is required for sessions held in the course of production support.*

Implementation example: T-Systems CRD/TPAM, Oracle Secure Global Desktop including the Toolbox-Plugin or Citrix XenApp Platinum offer this kind of functionality.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.20-32/7.0

| Req 33 | The session log must provide additional parameters. |
|---|---|

The additional parameters are:

1. Number of the fault ticket
2. Defined time frame
3. ID of the initiating representative of the Deutsche Telekom Group
4. In the case of abnormal termination (e.g., expiry of the time frame): Specification of abnormal termination and the corresponding reason

The majority of this information is registered when a representative of the Deutsche Telekom Group creates a session ticket for temporary access for production support.

**This requirement is only applicable in the following scenarios:**

- Production support/maintenance: IT system/software/hardware support/maintenance for/of production systems

*Motivation: In the event of security incidents, audit trails provide important information.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.20-33/7.0

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|---|---|
| Req 34 | The 3PAP must attach a digital signature to session recordings when they are created. |

**This requirement is only applicable in the following scenarios:**

- Production support/maintenance: IT system/software/hardware support/maintenance for/of production systems

*Motivation: It is important to ensure the authenticity of audit trails.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.20-34/7.0

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|---|---|
| Req 35 | The 3PAP must save session logs in a separate log archive. |

Session logs must be transmitted to the log server securely (e.g., via sftp). The interval between protocol transmissions must be as short as possible.

*Motivation: It is important to protect audit trails. Thus they should not remain in at risk components.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.20-35/7.0

## 2.8. Authentication and authorization

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| Req 36 | The use of system functions that require protection as well as access to internal or confidential data must not be possible without prior authentication and authorization. |

The use of functions of the system that require protection as well as access to data classified as internal or confidential

must only be possible after the user has been uniquely identified and successfully authenticated by means of the user name and at least one authentication attribute. In addition, it must be verified that the user is authorized to access the affected functions and data within the user role assigned to him or her in the system.

An exception to this are functions and data that may be used publicly without restriction; for example, the area of a website on the Internet where only public information is provided.

Examples of features that require prior authentication include:

- Remote access to network services (such as SSH, SFTP, web services)
- Local access to the management console
- Local use of operating system and applications

Examples of authentication features that can be used:

- Passwords
- cryptographic keys or certificates (e.g., in the form of smart cards)

This requirement also applies without restriction to any machine access to the system (here the implementation is usually carried out by using so-called M2M - "Machine-to-Machine" - user accounts).

*Motivation: The unambiguous authentication and authorization of access to a system are elementary to protect functions and data from misuse.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-19/8.0

| Req 37 | User accounts must be protected with at least one authentication attribute. |
|---|---|

All user accounts in a system must be protected against unauthorized use.

For this purpose, the user account must be secured with an authentication attribute that enables the accessing user to be unambiguously authenticated. Common authentication attributes are e.g.:

- passwords, passphrases, PINs (factor KNOWLEDGE: "something that only the legitimate user knows")
- cryptographic keys, tokens, smart cards, OTP (factor OWNERSHIP: "something that only the legitimate user has")
- biometric features such as fingerprints or hand geometry (factor INHERENCE: "something that only the legitimate user is")

The authentication of users by means of an authentication attribute that can be faked or spoofed by an attacker (e.g. telephone numbers, IP addresses, VPN affiliation) is generally not permitted.

In companies of Deutsche Telekom group where the MyCard or a comparable smartcard is available this should be a preferred authentication attribute.

If the system and the application scenario support it, multiple independent authentication attributes should be combined if possible in order to achieve an additional increase in security (so-called MFA or Multi-Factor-Authentication).

*Motivation: User accounts that are not protected by appropriate authentication attributes can be abused by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a system and the data and applications stored on it.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-20/8.0

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|---|---|
| Req 38 | Privileged user accounts must be protected with at least two authentication attributes from different factors. |

A privileged user account is a user account with extended authorizations within a system. Extended authorizations enable access to configuration settings, functions or data that are not available to regular users of the system. In direct dependence on the special tasks that are carried out via a privileged user account within a system, the assigned extended authorizations can be specifically restricted or include completely unrestricted system access.

Examples of privileged user accounts:
- Accounts for administration, maintenance or troubleshooting tasks
- Accounts for user administration tasks (e.g. creating/deleting users; assigning permissions or roles; resetting passwords)
- Accounts that are authorized to legitimize, initiate or prevent business-critical processes
- Accounts that have access to data classified as SCD (Sensitive Customer Data) in the interests of Group Deutsche Telekom, its customers or the public
- Accounts that have extensive access to data defined as "personal" according to the EU-GDPR (e.g. mass retrieval of larger parts or the complete database)

A single authentication attribute for privileged user accounts with their extended authorizations is usually no longer sufficient.

In order to achieve an adequate level of protection, at least two mutually independent authentication attributes must be used. The authentication attributes must come from various factors (knowledge, ownership, inherence). A combination of authentication attributes of the same factor (e.g. two different passwords) is not permitted

This approach is commonly referred to as MFA (Multi-Factor Authentication).
A specific form of MFA is 2FA (2-factor authentication), which combines exactly two authentication attributes.

*Motivation: Privileged user accounts represent an increased risk to the security of a system. If an attacker successfully compromises such a user account, he receives extensive authorizations with which he can bring the system or system parts under his control, disrupt system functions, view/manipulate processed data or influence business-critical processes. The combination of multiple authentication attributes of different types significantly minimizes the risk of a user account being compromised.*

Implementation example: Very popular is 2FA in a variant consisting of an attribute that the user knows (factor KNOWLEDGE) and an attribute that the user possesses (factor OWNERSHIP).
Examples of such a 2FA are:
- smartcard (e.g. MyCard) plus PIN
- private key plus passphrase
- classic password plus hardware token for the generation of OTPs

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-21/8.0

| Req 39 | Third party users or business interfaces must be authenticated using a sufficiently secure method. |
|---|---|

A 2-factor authentication must be implemented for user interfaces. For system-to-system interfaces, a bidirectional, key-based authentication is required.

*Motivation: Only authorized users from a third party can gain access to the target systems.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system

ID: 3.20-39/7.0

| Req 40 | User accounts must ensure the unique identification of the user. |
|---|---|

Users must be identified unambiguously by the system.

This can typically be reached by using a unique user account per user.

So-called group accounts, which are characterized by the fact that they are used jointly by several people, must not be used. This also applies without restriction to privileged user accounts. Most systems initially have only a single user account with administrative privileges after the basic installation. If the system is to be administered by several persons, each of these persons must use a personal, individual user account to which appropriate administrative authorizations or roles are assigned

A special feature are so named technical user accounts. These are used for the authentication and authorization of systems among themselves or of applications on a system and can therefore not be assigned to a specific person. Such user accounts must be assigned on a per system or per application basis. In this connection, it has to be ensured that these user accounts can't be misused.
Ways to prevent misuse of such user accounts by individuals include:

- Configuration of a password that meets the security requirements and is known to as few administrators as possible.
- Configuring the user account that only a local use is possible and a interactive login isn't possible.
- Use of a technique for authentication of the specific user account with public and private key or certificates.
- Limiting the access over the network to legitimate systems.

Additional solution must be checked on their usability per individual case.

*Motivation: Unambiguous user identification is mandatory to assign a user permissions that are necessary to perform the required tasks on the system. This is the only way to adequately control access to system data and services and to prevent misuse. Furthermore, it makes it possible to log activities and actions on a system and to assign them to individual users.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-22/8.0

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|---|---|
| Req 41 | The permissions for users and applications must be limited to the extent necessary to fulfill their tasks. |

The permissions on a system must be restricted to such an extent that a user can only access data and use functions that he needs in the context of his work. Appropriate permissions must also be assigned for access to files that are part of the operating system or applications or that are generated by the same (e.g. configuration and logging files).

In addition to access to data, applications and their components must also be executed with the lowest possible permissions. Applications should not be run with administrator or system privileges.

*Motivation: If a user is granted too far-reaching permissions on a system, he can access data and applications to an extent that is not necessary for the fulfillment of the assigned tasks. This creates an unnecessarily increased risk in the event of abuse, in particular if the user or his user account is compromised by an attacker.*
*Applications with too far-reaching permissions can be misused by an attacker to gain or expand unauthorized access to data and system areas in need of protection.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-23/8.0

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|---|---|
| Req 42 | Access by users from the third party must comply with a role-based access model. |

The 3PAP must implement a role-based model with regard to the target system and the services offered on the platform.
Example: A 3P role effects a technical restriction of access to specific target systems. Other systems are unavailable and thus are not threatened. For example, if the 3PAP offers access to files for the 3P (proxy functions), the access roles define exactly which upload or download directories are available.

*Motivation: Tailored access roles technically prevent unauthorized access.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

ID: 3.20-42/7.0

## 2.8.1. Authentication attribute "password"

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| Req 43 | If passwords are used as an authentication attribute, those must be stored using a suitable and approved "Password Hashing" method to protect against offline-attacks like brute force or dictionary attacks. |

This requirement relates to the storage of passwords in all types of user databases, as used in this system, in order to authenticate incoming access (local or remote) by users or other systems.

If an attacker obtains the copy of a user database of the system, he is able to bring it into a fully independent environment and utilize automatized dictionary or brute force attacks to determine contained passwords. Specialized tools in combination with high computing power allow for high cracking rates in a relatively short period of time, if protective measures are insufficient. Due to the independency from the source system, such an offline attack happens unnoticed.

The following countermeasure must be implemented, since this ensures best possible protection against offline at-

tacks:

- passwords must be stored using a cryptographic one-way function (known as "Password Hashing") that is recognized as effective for this purpose and is classified as secure at the current state of the art.

Please Note: valid password hashing algorithms are described in Security Requirement Catalog "3.50 Cryptographic Algorithms and Security Protocols".

Explicitly NOT PERMISSIBLE is:

- to store passwords in cleartext
- to store passwords in any format which can be directly backcalculated
- to store passwords using reversible encryption

Please Note:
In this context, "directly backcalculatable formats" refers to those that simply encode the password, without involving a secret key in the transformation process. Since the password will no longer show up as original cleartext after it has been processed, those formats may easily be mistaken to provide confidentiality. Effectively, they do not offer any protection. The enconding is fixed and therefore an attacker can easily make use of it to compute the original cleartext password from the encoded string.
Examples for directly backcalculatable formats are: "base64", "rot13"
"Reversible" are all encryption methods which, using the appropriate key, enable encrypted content to be transformed back into the original content. Accordingly, with reversible encryption there is always the challenge of keeping the key secure and protecting it from unauthorized access. Reversibility is a required fundamental property in many areas of encryption applications, e.g. for transferring confidential messages, but it is counterproductive for storing passwords: a stored password must remain comparable by means of technical methods, but it must no longer be possible to convert it back into plain text in order to protect it as well as possible from unauthorized viewing.
Examples for reversible encryption are: "AES", "CHACHA20", "3DES", "RSA"

*Motivation: Without protective measures, an attacker in possession of a user database copy is able to determine masses of contained passwords in short time by merely trying out character string combinations or making use of dictionaries. Passwords stored in cleartext or any backcalculatable format are fully defenseless to an offline attack. Once a password has been ascertained it can be used by an attacker for unauthorized access to the system and the data on it.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-24/8.0

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|---|---|
| Req 44 | If a password is used as an authentication attribute, a protection against online attacks like brute force and dictionary attacks that hinder password guessing must be implemented. |

Online brute force and dictionary attacks aim for a regular access interface of the system while making use of automated guessing to ascertain passwords for user accounts.

To prevent this, a countermeasure or a combination of countermeasures from the following list must be implemented:

- technical enforcement of a waiting period after a login failed, right before another login attempt will be granted. The waiting period shall increase significantly with any further successive failed login attempt (for example, by doubling the waiting time after each failed attempt)
- automatic disabling of the user account after a defined quantity of successive failed login attempts (usually 5). However, it has to be taken into account that this solution needs a process for unlocking user accounts and an attacker can abuse this to deactivate accounts and make them temporarily unusable

- Using CAPTCHA ("**C**ompletely**A**utomated**P**ublic**T**uring test to tell**C**omputers and**H**umans**A**part") to prevent automated login attempts by machines ("robots" or "bots") as much as possible. A CAPTCHA is a small task that is usually based on graphical or acoustic elements and is difficult to solve by a machine. It must be taken into account that CAPTCHA are usually not barrier-free.

In order to achieve higher security, it is often meaningful to combine two or more of the measures named here. This must be evaluated in individual cases and implemented accordingly.

*Motivation: Without any protection mechanism an attacker can possibly determine a password by executing dictionary lists or automated creation of character combinations. With the guessed password than the misuse of the according user account is possible.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-25/8.0

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|---|---|
| Req 45 | If a password is used as an authentication attribute, it must have at least 12 characters and contain three of the following categories: lower-case letters, upper-case letters, digits and special characters. |

A system may only accept passwords that comply with the following complexity rules:
- Minimum length of 12 characters.
- Comprising at least three of the following four character categories:
  - lower-case letters
  - upper-case letters
  - digits
  - special characters

The usable maximum length of passwords shall not be limited to less then 25 characters. This will provide more freedom to End Users when composing individual memorizable passwords and helps to prevent undesired behavior in password handling.

When a password is assigned, the system must ensure that the password meets these policies. This must be preferably enforced by technical measures; if such cannot be implemented, organizational measures must be established.
If a central system is used for user authentication [see also Root Security Requirements Document[i] "3.69 IAM (Identity Access Management) - Framework"], it is valid to forward or delegate this task to that central system.

**Permissible deviation in the password minimum length**
Under security-related criteria, conditions can potentially be identified for a system that enable the minimum password length to be reduced:
- It is generally permissible to reduce the minimum password length for systems that use additional independent authentication attributes within the authentication process in addition to the password (implementation of 2-Factor or Multi-Factor Authentication).
- Any reduction in the minimum password length must be assessed individually by a technical security advisor (e. g. a PSM from Telekom Security) and confirmed as permissible. In the assessment, the surrounding technical, organizational and legal framework parameters must be taken into account, as well as the system-specific protection requirements and the potential amount of damage in the event of security incidents.
- The absolute minimum value of 8 characters length for passwords must not be undercut.

*Motivation: Passwords with the above complexity offer contemporary robustness against attacks coupled with acceptable user friendliness. Passwords with this level of complexity have proven their efficiency in practice. Trivial and short passwords are susceptible to brute force and dictionary attacks and are therefore easy for attackers to determine. Once a password has been ascertained it can be used by an attacker for unauthorized access to the system and the data on it.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-26/8.0

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|---|---|
| Req 46 | If a password is used as an authentication attribute for technical accounts, it must have at least 30 characters and contain three of the following categories: lower-case letters, upper-case letters, digits and special characters. |

Technical user accounts are characterized by the fact that they are not used by people. Instead, they are used to authenticate and authorize systems to each other or applications on a system.

A system must only use passwords for technical user accounts that meet the following complexity:
- Minimum length of 30 characters
- Comprising at least three of the following four character categories:
  - lower-case letters
  - upper-case letters
  - digits
  - special characters

*Motivation: Due to their use in machine-to-machine (M2M) communication scenarios, technical user accounts are often equipped with privileges that can be of high interest to an attacker to compromise infrastructures. Without mechanisms of extensive compromise detection, the risk of a password being determined or broken by an attacker can increase significantly over time. A significant increase in password length counteracts these risks and can also be implemented particularly easily in M2M scenarios, since handling a very long password is not a particular challenge for a machine (as opposed to a person).*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-27/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 47 | If a password is used as an authentication attribute, the reuse of previous passwords must be prevented. |

A history of the previously used passwords must be recorded for each user account. When a password change is initiated for a user account, the new password must be compared with this password history. If the reuse of a password is detected, the password change must be rejected. This validation process must be implemented in the system on the basis of technical measures. If a central IAM system is used for user authentication, the implementation can be forwarded to the central IAM system or outsourced there [see also Root Security Requirements Document[i] "3.69 IAM

(Identity Access Management) - Framework"].

In general, the password history should ensure that a password that has already been used can never be used again.

However, due to technical limitations, a password history cannot be recorded indefinitely in many IT/NT products. In this case, the following basic rules must be observed:

- a password that has already been used must not be reusable for a period of at least 60 days (measured from the point in time at which the affected password was replaced by another)
- in systems in which the period of at least 60 days cannot be implemented, the longest possible period must be configured. In addition, it must be confirmed by a Project Security Manager (PSM) that the configured period is still sufficient in the overall context of the system with regard to the security requirement.

Annotation:
Some IT/NT products do not offer any technical configuration parameters with which the password history can be linked directly to a time period, but only allow the definition of the number of passwords to be recorded. In such cases, the time period can alternatively be ensured by linking the following, usually generally available configuration parameters. Within the resulting policy, a user can only change his password once a day and, due to the number of passwords recorded, can reuse an old password effectively after 60 days at the earliest.

- Minimum Password Age: 1 day
- Password History: Record of the last 60 passwords used

With this implementation variant, it should be noted that the minimum age for the password should not be more than one day in order not to inappropriately restrict the user with regard to the fundamental need to be able to change the password independently at any time.

*Motivation: Users prefer passwords that are easy to remember and often use them repeatedly over long periods of time when the system allows. From the user's point of view, the behavior is understandable, but effectively leads to a considerable reduction in the protective effect of this authentication parameter. With adequate knowledge of the user or information obtained from previous system compromises, an attacker can gain access to supposedly protected user accounts. Particularly in situations in which new initial passwords are assigned centrally as part of an acute risk treatment, but users change them immediately to a previous password for the sake of simplicity, there is a high risk that an attacker will resume illegal access. It is therefore important to prevent users from reusing old passwords.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-28/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 48 | If a password is used as an authentication attribute, users must be able to independently change the password anytime. |

The system must offer a function that enables a user to change his password at any time.

When an external centralized system for user authentication is used, it is valid to redirect or implement this function on this system.

*Motivation: The fact that a user can change his authentication attribute himself at any time enables him to change it promptly if he suspects that it could have been accessed by a third party.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system

- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-29/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 49 | If a password is used as an authentication attribute, it must be changed after 12 months at the latest. |

The maximum permitted usage period for passwords is 12 months.
If a password reaches the maximum permitted usage period, it must be changed.

For this purpose, the system must automatically inform the user about the expired usage period the next time he logs on to the system and immediately guide him through a dialog to change the password. Access to the system must no longer be permitted without a successfully completed password change.
For technical user accounts (M2M or Machine-2-Machine), which are used for the authentication and authorization of systems among themselves or by applications on a system, automated solutions must also be implemented to comply with the permitted usage period for passwords.

Alternatively, if such an automatic mapping of the process for changing the password cannot be implemented, an effective organizational measure must be applied instead, wich ensures a binding manual password change at the end of the permissible period of use.

*Motivation: Unlike more modern authentication attributes, passwords are easier to attack. Without specific measures for reliable, technically automated detection of compromises, the risk of a password being discovered or broken by an attacker can increase considerably over time.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-30/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 50 | If passwords are used as an authentication attribute, they must not be displayed in plain text during input. |

Passwords must not be displayed in legible plain text on screens or other output devices while they are entered. A display while entering must not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the characters actually used in the password.

This requirement applies to all types of password input masks and fields.
Examples of this are dialogs for password assignment, password-based login to systems or changing existing passwords.

Exceptions:

- Within an input field, an optional plain text representation of a password is permitted, provided that this plain-text representation serves a valid purpose, exists only temporarily, has to be explicitly activated by the legitimate user on a case-by-case basis and can also be deactivated again immediately by the latter.
  A valid purpose would be, for example, to allow the legitimate user an uncomplicated visual check, if necessary, that he has entered the password correctly in a login dialog before finally completing the login.
  Such an optional plain text representation of a password must remain fully in the control of the legitimate user so that he can decide on its activation/deactivation according to the situation. In the default setting of the sys-

tem, the plain text representation must be deactivated.

- The typical behavior on many mobile devices (smartphones) of displaying each individual character very briefly in plain text when entering a password - in order to make it easier for the user to control input - is fundamentally permissible there. However, the full password must never be displayed in plain text on the screen.

*Motivation: In the case of a plain text display, there is a risk that third parties can randomly or deliberately spy on a password via the screen output while typing.*

Implementation example: When displayed on the screen, each individual character is uniformly replaced by a "*" while entering a password.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-31/8.0

## 2.9. Logging and Monitoring

| Req 51 | The system clock must be synchronized to an accurate reference time (Time Standard). |
|---|---|

A time reference source must be used which provides a time signal based on the Coordinated Universal Time ("UTC" = "**U**niversal **T**ime **C**oordinated").

*Please Note: The UTC-synchronized system time may be transformed to local time using a corresponding timezone configuration setup for any output of time information, as long as this timezone adjustment is fully accountable.*

Systems belonging to the same security domain must synchronize to one and the same time reference source.

*Motivation: Reference time synchronization may be a technical prerequisite for many time-dependent mechanisms, for example: Validation of Certificates; Authentication. It is also much-needed to generate exact timestamps for logged events, since without the often required time-related correlation in case of a Security Incident or during a Problem Analysis cannot be achieved.*

Implementation example: some valid time reference sources:

- trustworthy NTP ("**N**etwork**T**ime**P**rotocol") Server on the IP network
- DCF77 radio signal received via a physically connected receiver
- GPS radio signal received via a physically connected receiver

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-32/8.0

| Req 52 | Security-related events must be logged with an exact timestamp and a unique system reference. |
|---|---|

Security-relevant are any events that may have an impact on the information security (confidentiality, integrity, availability) of a system or indicate its misuse. Systems must log the occurrence of security-related events.
In order to enable the assignment and evaluation of these events, they must be logged together with a unique system

name (e.g. host name, IP or MAC address) and the exact time of occurrence ("time stamp"). At a minimum, the timestamp of a logged event must include the following information:

- date of the event (Year, Month, Day)
- time of the event (Hours, Minutes, Seconds)
- Timezone, those information belongs to

The security relevance of specific events depends on the type and function of the system as well as the data processed in it. Therefore, it is not possible to specify a uniform list of events that are relevant to security. Relevant events must be identified according to the system. The following list contains typical security-related events and is accordingly to be understood as a basic guide for the identification of security-relevant events for a particular system.

| Security-related Event | Information to log to the event |
|---|---|
| Failed login attempts | • affected user account<br>• number of failed attempts<br>• source of access (IP address, client-ID/client-name, local console, ...) |
| System access via user accounts (including system accounts or technical user accounts) | • affected user account<br>• Access start/end time (login/logout)<br>• source of access (IP address, client-ID/client-name, local console, ...) |
| Modifications of user accounts (including system accounts or technical user accounts) | • user account used to make the modification<br>• user account to which the modification was made<br>• type of modification made (create, activate, deactivate, delete, password reset, ...) |
| Changes to role assignements/permissions of user accounts (including system accounts or technical user accounts) | • user account used to make the modification<br>• user account to which the modification was made<br>• name of the affected role, type of the affected permission<br>• type of modification made (role/permission added, role/permission removed, ...) |
| Use/initiation of critical system functions | • user account used to make the use<br>• name/type of system function used |
| Access to sensitive data processed in the system | • user account used to access the data<br>• Name of the affected data field (the contents of the data field should not be logged to prevent data leakage via log files)<br>• type of access (read, modify, delete, ...) |
| Abnormal increase in the utilization of system resources, such as memory, CPU, network, or disk access, over an extended period of time | • threshold of the affected system resource<br>• duration of exceeding the threshold<br>• threshold exceedance<br>Depending on the individual system, sensible threshold values must be defined. |
| Other events that may provide evidence of attempted or successful attacks against the system *) | • individually depending on the type of event |

*) *This requires identifying the most important forms of attack that the system can typically expect and ensuring that events relevant to their detection are actually logged by the system. As a rule, this can only be guaranteed by the de-*

*veloper/manufacturer of the system.*

When logging, the applicable legal and operational regulations must be observed. The latter also include agreements that have been made with the company's social partners. Following these regulations logging of events is only allowed for a defined use case. Logging of events for doing a work control of employees is not allowed.

In addition - as for any data that is processed by a system - an appropriate protection requirement must also be taken into account and implemented for logging data; this applies to storage, transmission and access. In particular, if the logging data contains real data, the same protection requirements must be taken into account that is also used for the regular processing of this real data within the source system.

*Motivation: Logging security-relevant events is a basic requirement for detecting ongoing attacks as well as attacks that have already occurred. This is the only way in which suitable measures can be taken to maintain or restore system security. Logging data could be used as evidence to take legal steps against attackers.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-33/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 53 | The system must log every successful/failed attempt to access the 3PAP. |

*Motivation: In the event of security incidents, audit trails provide important information.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.20-53/7.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 54 | Applicable retention and deletion periods must be observed for security-relevant logging data that is recorded locally. |

From an IT security perspective, local storage of security-relevant logging data on a system is not mandatory. Since the local storage can be damaged in the event of system malfunctions or manipulated by a successful attacker, it can only be used to a limited extent for security-related or forensic analyses. Accordingly, it is relevant for IT security that logging data is forwarded to a separate log server.

Local storage can nevertheless take place; for example, if local storage is initially indispensable when generating the logging data due to technical processes or if there are justified operational interests in also keeping logging data available locally.

The following basic rules must be taken into account when storing logging data locally:

- Security-related logging data must be retained for a period of 90 days.
  (*This requirement only applies if no additional forwarding to a separate log server is implemented on the system and the logging data is therefore only recorded locally.*)
- After 90 days, stored logging data must be deleted immediately.

**Deviances**

Different retention periods and deletion periods may exist due to legal or regulatory requirements (especially in connection with personal data) or may be defined by contractual agreements. In these cases, the applicable periods must be agreed individually with a Project Security Manager (PSM) / Data Privacy Advisor (DPA) or are specified by them.

*Motivation: Logging data is an immensely important IT security tool for preventing, detecting and clearing up system*

*faults, security and data privacy incidents. On the other hand, the recording of logging data, like any other data processing, is also subject to legal and regulatory requirements. Accordingly, guidelines must be adhered to that reconcile the two.*

Implementation example: Taking into account the current legal situation and applicable data privacy regulations, the following deletion periods for locally stored security-relevant logging data are implemented on an exemplary telecommunications system:

- Standard System Logs: Deletion after 90 days at the latest
- Logging of public IP addresses: Deletion (or anonymization) after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the assignment of dynamic public IP addresses by the telecommunication solution: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of non-billing-relevant call detail records: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the content of e-mail and SMS: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest
- Logging of the domain queries handled by the DNS server of the telecommunications solution: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-34/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 55 | Security-relevant logging data must be forwarded to a separate log server immediately after it has been generated. |

Logging data must be forwarded to a separate log server immediately after it has been generated. Standardized protocols such as Syslog, SNMPv3 should be preferred.

*Motivation: If logging data is only stored locally, it can be manipulated by an attacker who succeeds in compromising the system in order to conceal his attack and any manipulation he has performed on the system. This is the reason why the forwarding must be done immediately after the event occurred.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-35/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 56 | For security-relevant logging data that is forwarded to the separate log server, compliance with the applicable retention and deletion periods must be ensured. |

The following basic rules must be taken into account:

- security-related logging data must be retained for a period of 90 days on the separate log server.
- after 90 days, stored logging data must be deleted immediately on the separate log server.

**Deviances**
Different retention periods and deletion periods may exist due to legal or regulatory requirements (especially in connection with personal data) or may be defined by contractual agreements. In these cases, the applicable periods must be agreed individually with a Project Security Manager (PSM) / Data Privacy Advisor (DSB) or are specified by them.

**Log server under the responsibility of a third party**
If the selected separate log server is not within the same operational responsibility as the source system of the loggin data, it must be ensured that the responsible operator of the log server is aware of the valid parameters for the logging data to be received and that they are adhered to in accordance with the regulations mentioned here.

*Motivation: Logging data is an immensely important IT security tool for preventing, detecting and clearing up system faults, security and data privacy incidents. On the other hand, the recording of logging data, like any other data processing, is also subject to legal and regulatory requirements. Accordingly, guidelines must be adhered to that reconcile the two.*

Implementation example: Taking into account the current legal situation and applicable data privacy regulations, the following deletion periods for forwarded security-relevant logging data from an exemplary telecommunications system are implemented on the separate log server:

- Standard System Logs: Deletion after 90 days at the latest
- Logging of public IP addresses: Deletion (or anonymization) after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the assignment of dynamic public IP addresses by the telecommunication solution: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of non-billing-relevant call detail records: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the content of e-mail and SMS: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest
- Logging of the domain queries handled by the DNS server of the telecommunications solution: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-36/8.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 57 | Security-relevant logging data must be provided to a security incident detection and response solution in near-real-time. |

The forms of attack that are typically to be expected for the present system must be systematically analyzed and identified.
The MITRE Attack Matrix (https://attack.mitre.org) can be used as a structured guide during such an identification.

It must be ensured that the system generates appropriate logging data on events that are or may be related to these identified forms of attack and that can be used to detect an attack that is taking place.

The logging data must be sent to a SIEM immediately after the system event occurs.
SIEM (Security Information & Event Management) solutions collect event log data from various source systems, correlate it and evaluate it automatically in real time in order to detect anomalous activities such as ongoing attacks on IT/NT systems and to be able to initiate alarms or countermeasures.
The immediate receipt of system events is therefore absolutely crucial for the SIEM to fulfill its protective functions.

*Motivation: IT/NT systems are constantly exposed to security threats and attacks. By means of a central analysis and the correlation of recorded system events of entire IT landscapes in almost real time, current threats and ongoing attacks can be detected even beyond system boundaries and appropriate countermeasures can be initiated promptly. The prompt delivery of logging data to the detection and response solution is essential for its effectiveness.*

Implementation example: **Example 1:** A system based on a classic server collects security-relevant logging data in the operating system's local syslog or Windows Event Log. Logging data is continuously forwarded to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) for further analysis, intrusion detection, and alarm handling.

**Example 2:** An Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agent is running on a system. The EDR agent continuously forwards the security-related logging data it collects on the system to the central backend of the EDR solution, where further analysis, intrusion detection, and alarm handling takes place

**Example 3:** Systems designed on the basis of cloud-native functions generate logging data directly from these functions using the cloud's own logging and monitoring infrastructure. In such a system, the generation of security-relevant logging data is specifically activated in the corresponding configuration options of the cloud-native functions used. The resulting logging data is continuously transferred to a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) for further analysis, intrusion detection and alarm handling. Some cloud providers already provide some attack pattern detection in the cloud's own monitoring infrastructure and generate specific cloud alerts from it. These are also transferred to the SIEM.

**Example 4:** A system is based on a SaaS ("Software as a Service") application from a cloud provider. Typically, in the SaaS model, the cloud provider is responsible for all operational aspects of the application, including security management. The cloud customer itself has no influence on the underlying technical infrastructure or the operation of the application. Based on contractual agreements, recognized certificates, and documented self-disclosures from the cloud provider, it is formally verified that the cloud provider has implemented a security incident detection and response solution. Some cloud providers also generate dedicated logging data about security-relevant activities within the separate customer tenants of their SaaS application (e.g. changes to configuration settings, permission assignments or user accounts within the tenants) and make them available to cloud customers. These so-called audit logs are continuously transferred to a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) for further analysis, attack detection and alarm handling.

ID: 3.20-57/7.0

| | |
|---|---|
| Req 58 | A set of security monitoring measures tailored to the specific design of the 3PAP must be implemented. |

The required security measures can be composed of a comabination of different technologies specific to the 3PAP architecture (e.g. SIEM, IDS, flow data analysis, dedicated checkscripts).

*Motivation: Intrusions on the 3PAP should be identified promptly.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.20-58/7.0

# 3. Organisational Requirements

| Req 59 | Each 3P connection must be registered in a 3P access directory. |
|---|---|

The directory can be either central or LBU-specific.

*Motivation: Up-to-date documentation of external connections is a basic requirement for ensuring the security status of the networks of the Deutsche Telekom Group.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.20-59/7.0

| Req 60 | Defined details of the 3P connection must be registered. |
|---|---|

The directory can be either central or LBU-specific. The following details must be registered:

1. Responsible requestor of the 3P connection on the part of the Deutsche Telekom Group and their superior (name, e-mail address)
2. 3P contact information (name of the company, location/address, contact, e-mail address)
3. Description of purpose and tasks and reasons for 3P access
4. The 3P access platform used for the connection (including the relevant platform applications managers and/or service provider contacts)
5. First media access (e.g. IPSec VPN via the Internet, MPLS, dial-in, etc.)
6. Target systems and applications
7. Protocol(s) used for the system/application access (e.g. SSH, RDP, ICA, HTTPS, etc.)
8. Frequency of access

*Motivation: Motivation: Up-to-date documentation of external connections is a basic requirement for the provision of a continuous security state of the DT networks.*

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.20-60/7.0